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In the study of development, researchers attempt to 
identify and measure the independent variables believed to 
influence economic growth and social development indicators 
in countries throughout the world. These researchers employ 
quantitative cross-national research methods, also known as 
the variable-oriented approach, while others may pursue a 
more case-oriented approach and examine a handful of 
countries employing a historical-comparative method. 
Education is a variable that has been identified in both of 
these research traditions to be positively related to the 
development of a country. However, when the effects of 
education on development are examined cross-nationally, it-
is clear that the countries of Africa have not experienced 
the same levels of economic growth as countries in other 
regions, such as in Latin America and Asia. To find out 
why Africa is not experiencing the same rate of growth as 
other regions this study explored the barriers to 
educational attainment and economic development in a sample 
of three African countries: Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland,, 
A historical comparative approach was used to identify the 
historical factors giving rise to the present situation in 
each country. Each country's political, economic, and 
geographic history is discussed to provide a context for 
the present-day situation. The research then examined how 
a variety of decisions made by each country's leaders has 
shaped the ability of young children to attend school as 
well as shaping each country's overall development. This 
research project found that HIV/AIDS, land distribution, 
and corruption were the primary barriers in ail three 
countries that obstructed education from having a positive 
influence on development. Each country may not exhibit the 
same level of HIV/AIDS, land distribution, and corruption, 
but all three experience some form of these three 
inhibiting factors. The findings suggest that the factors 
stem from historical causes in each country as well as poor 
political decisions made by politicians and leaders over 
the last several decades. The study also concluded that 
the three inhibiting factors all work interdependently, and 
each problem cannot, be solved independently. The barring-
factors mitigate any effect education has on the 
viii 
development of the country by decreasing children's ability 
to attend school and decreasing tlie country's levels of 
huma n c ap ita1. 
IX 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of World War II and the dismantling of 
colonial empires throughout the world, the study of nation-
state development in the social sciences has endeavored to 
identify the factors influencing economic growth, social 
progress, and the levels of political freedom ana 
democratization. Development scholars have devoted 
considerable time and research to the effects of education, 
which researchers have demonstrated has a positive 
influence on economic and social growth within a country. 
For the lowest income countries of the world, expanding its 
educational system and increasing primary and secondary 
school enrollments can increase human-capital formation 
among their citizens, promoting higher standards of living 
and lower levels of extreme poverty. As educational 
attainment and literacy rates increase, countries are 
better able to attract multinational investors, thus 
providing employment opportunities for their citizens. For 
the last half-century, researchers throughout the world 
have tried to determine the effects educational 
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institutions have on shaping the development path for 
lower-income countries throughout the world (Bradshaw and 
Fuller .1.996) . 
In an "ideal-type" model the positive effects of 
education on human development within a nation state seem 
almost logical and irrefutable. However, in reality, there 
are numerous impediments in the development path, ana the 
effects of education on human development are not always 
positive, linear, and strong. Numerous factors such as 
government corruption, extreme poverty, and land-tenure 
issues may impede the progress that education can play in 
promoting development. It is nec essary to uncover and 
understand the barriers hindering development so that the 
efforts and decisions of policy makers and government 
officials are not in vain. Moreover, with more than two 
billion people in the world living on less than two dollars 
per day, it is essential for researchers and policy makers 
to fully understand the barriers impeding economic, social, 
and political development throughout the world (World Bank 
2007a). 
Africa is an .important, area in the study of 
development because its nations are some of the poorest and 
least developed in the world today. Researchers have 
expressed many reasons as to why Africa is not developing 
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as quickly as other regions (Abrokwaa 1999; Fuller 1987; 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka arid Barclay 2 004). However, much of the 
research does not examine the obstacles to development. 
These barriers slow the progress of many countries; and, 
when not addressed, these factors will continue to do so in 
the future. 
A vast body of research and literature exists on the 
history of African countries and the limited successes and 
vast pitfalls influencing their development paths. This 
research is an exploratory study using historical-
comparative methods in an attempt to better understand the 
barriers hindering human development. More specifically 
this research seeks to identify some of the issues and 
problems that are preventing educational institutions from 
having a positive effect on human development in a sample 
of case studies. 
The study explores the histories and the educational 
and development indicators for three African countries, 
Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland, to.illuminate the factors 
within each that bar the effects of education on a variety 
of development indicators. Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland 
were chosen as the cases for this research because of their 
different colonial legacies and current government 
structure. 
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Using a historical-comparative method, the history and 
geopolitical context of each country will be examined to 
expose some of the factors that are currently barring the 
effects of education on a variety of development indicators 
today. World Bank data from 1990-2004 were used to 
highlight the changes in economic and educational 
development that have taken place over the last decade and 
a half. Data were also culled from a variety of existing 
historical-comparative studies as well as in-depth case 
studies focusing on Cameroon, Swaziland, and Kenya. Books 
and journal articles by scholars from, a variety of academic 
disciplines as well as reports published by various 
international institutions, such as the World Bank, and the 
United Nations, provided key insights into the demographic, 
medical, educational, social, and geopolitical issues 
facing each of these countries. This research is an 
attempt to synthesize the development indicators from the 
World Bank with this existing body of research on Cameroon, 
Swaziland, and Kenya in an attempt to better understand the 
complexities and difficulties in promoting educational 
attainment and literacy in the path toward development. 
The results of this research suggest that each country 
has its own factors barring development, but .similar" 
patterns exist. Based on the historical-comparative 
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research discussed in the following chapters, access to 
i 
viable and fruitful farmland appears to be a significant, 
problem in all three of the countries in this study. A 
large sector of the population in these African countries 
relies on subsistence based farming, and the results of 
this research suggest that there are numerous impediments 
to development. Second, the detrimental effects of 
HIV/AIDS and the high infection rates in all three 
countries have influenced the ability of children in these 
countries to receive neither primary nor secondary school 
education. The high rates of infection have left many 
children orphaned or without parents, the absences of which 
eliminates any hope of a child being able to afford the 
school fees that exist for primary and/or secondary 
education. Finally, the results of this research suggest 
that very high levels of corruption continue to plague 
development efforts. While each country possesses its own 
unique historical legacies and contemporary challenges, 
these three general patterns appear to be limiting the 
possibilities of educational attainment and prevent 
education from having its hypothesized positive effect on 
development. 
Past research indicates that, by strengthening 
educational institutions, development will occur in a low-
income country. This study reveals that the factors that 
bar the effects of education on development must be 
addressed if a country is to develop. Other countries in 
Africa need to be examined to find whether the conclusion 
in this study are generalizable to all of Africa. Future 
research should focus on the inhibiting factors in 
different countries in Africa and other regions of the 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
When viewing a map of the world one will notice that 
the countries considered low-income were former colonies, 
were poverty stricken, and often have unstable governments 
or dictatorships. These low-income countries are striving 
to achieve a higher standard of living and a greater share 
of the world's income. Some former low-income states, such 
as Hong Kong and Taiwan, have achieved great prosperity 
while others have not fared as well. Sub-Saharan Africa 
falls into the latter category of world development. 
The former African colonies have not made the progress 
that former Latin American and Asian colonies have made. 
The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have the lowest life 
expectancy in.the world (World Bank 2007b). The vast 
majority of citizens residing within these countries 
survive on a dollar or two dollars a day. HIV/AIDS and 
malaria are rampant and often these countries experience 
unstable or corrupt governments that compound the already 
poor condition of the country. Today, social scientists 
are researching reasons why some areas are developing and 
7 
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others are not. Understanding why Africa has not developed 
as quickly as other regions can help to guide development 
studies in the future. 
After the colonial period ended in the 1950s, 
sociologists, economists, and political scientists have 
tried to explain and understand the factors associated with 
development. As a result of World War II, many colonial 
countries sought and eventually gained independence. As 
these countries formed their governments, they experimented 
with many governing structures such as democracies, one-
party states, and authoritarian regimes. These same 
countries experimented with varying degrees of free-market 
capitalism, and many explored the possibility of a 
communist economic system. The United States government 
encouraged social scientists to study the development of 
these new nation-states so the West would not "lose" these 
countries to the communist Soviet Union. 
Modernization Theory 
The theory that emerged from scholars in the United 
States to explain development was modernization theory, 
which states that modernization takes a logical, linear 
path like a plane taking off (Rostow 1964). Mcdernization 
theorists believed that low-income countries were at an 
advantage because low-income countries had examples to 
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follow just by looking at previously successful countries. 
Low-income countries should mimic the actions that the 
high-income countries took to develop.and should learn from 
their mistakes. Therefore, the newly independent countries 
of Africa and Asia should have followed the example of the 
high-income countries (the United States, Japan, and the 
other G8 nations) to develop. 
Rostow (19 64) demonstrated that development was like a 
plane taking off from an airport in which there are steps 
each country must take before development can take place. 
He identified five stages that a country must complete to 
develop successfully. In using the analogy of the plane, 
at first it is stationary and a country is traditional. 
Then the plane slowly begins to taxi, and a country begins 
to slowly expand markets and open new industries. Next 
Rostow explains that a plane will take off the runway and .a 
country will have self-sustained growth by increasing 
capital in resources in the country. Once the plane has 
lifted off the ground and can stay in the air, the fourth 
stage is reached. A country at this stage will have an 
automatic rate of growth. In the final stage the plane 
will level off and bring its landing gear up; the country 
will be fully developed with a mass consumption economy. 
Smelser (1964) agreed with Rostow's belief that low-
income countries should mirror high-income countries when 
they begin to develop. Modernization leads to 
differentiation of labor and skills (e.g. Adam Smith and 
Emile Durkhiem). When labor and skills are divided into 
specialized functions, the economy will run more 
efficiently; thus, development will occur The high-income 
areas of the world have specialized so the low-income world 
should specialize as the high-income world has. 
To illustrate some benefits to development Inkeless 
(1964) examined how modernization affects people. Modern 
men, according to -Inkeless, shared openness to new 
experiences, held a belief in science, planned for the long 
term, wanted to be mobile in their occupations, wanted 
independence from authority figures, and were active in 
politics. Inkeless stated that education was the most 
important indicator of modern values. The exposure to the 
Western values and learning style developed "modern men." 
His work illustrates the belief that low-income countries 
can develop through educating and socializing their people 
to Western culture and institutions. 
Modernization theory is an evolutionary stage that 
countries will undergo. Countries that develop will 
develop in phases, as Rostow's (1964) example of a plane 
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taking off the runway explained. Development is a 
homogenizing process because all countries will begin to 
look like one another as time goes on. Europe and America 
should be taken as the example of what development can 
occur and will occur for low-income countries. There .is an 
assumption that modernization is irreversible and that 
development is desirable to being undeveloped. Development 
brings a better way of life and undeveloped countries 
should strive to achieve what others already have. 
Modernization theory also explains that development will 
not take place overnight but will take place in stages over 
an extended period of time. 
Critics of modernization theory argue that European 
countries had different historical and ecological 
circumstances compared to the low-income countries of the 
1950s that make it impossible for them to imitate their 
success. Moreover, countries can move forward and backward 
on a development scale; and, because of the capitalist 
world economy, countries at the bottom have been used as 
sources of raw materials and inexpensive labor, with the 
profits from such activities going to high-income countries 
and not being reinvested in the low-income countries 
(Wallerstein 1974a). Also, modernization theory was 
labeled as elitist because the theory states that low-
12 
income countries can simply do what a high-income country 
has done to develop (Bodenheimer 197 0). In the end 
modernization theory fell out of favor as a model practical 
for development. 
Dependency Theory 
The criticisms of modernization theory led to the 
formation of dependency theory. Dependency theory grew out 
of the work of Latin American scholars, who stated that 
development cannot happen while low-income countries are 
d.ependent on high-income countries for capital, technology, 
and resources (Blomstrom and Hette 1984; Frank 1967), 
According to dependency theory, low-income countries 
comprise a periphery that is dependent on high-income 
"core" countries for capital profits, and surplus flows 
from low-income to high-income countries. This dependence 
leads to greater underdevelopment for countries in the 
periphery (Dos Santos 1971). Core countries sell 
technology to peripheral countries to help countries 
develop, but the peripheral countries have to pay the core 
countries for the technology; therefore, profits of this 
new market go to core countries, while the periphery often 
experience higher levels of debt. By being dependent on. 
high-income countries low-income countries will never fully 
develop the way that high-income countries have, but will 
remain in a subordinate position in which the low-income 
countries will become underdeveloped (Frank 1967). 
According to Dos Santos (1971) high-income countries 
are developing at the expense of low-income countries. Dos 
Santos explained that there is a structure to dependence, 
which follows a historical path of colonial, financial-
industrial, and technological-industrial dependence. In 
colonial dependence a high-income country takes control of 
a low-income country's land and markets; thus, the high-
income country acquires the wealth of the low-income 
country's resources. Low-income countries become dependent 
on the export of their raw materials and agriculture to 
high-income countries in the financial-industrial form of 
dependence. Next in the technology-industrial form of 
dependence, low-income countries become dependent on 
exporting their goods to high-income countries. High-
income countries have a monopoly on how much a good should 
cost and can undercut the value of low-income countries' 
goods. High-income countries also control the technology 
that low-income countries need to produce and sell their 
goods; therefore, low-income countries become dependent on 
high-income countries to buy their goods and sell them the 
technology they need to compete. 
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Expanding on the dependent nature of low-income 
countries Cardoso (1973) explained how low-income countries 
engage in associated-dependent development. Cardoso argued 
that foreign corporations are intertwined with the internal 
prosperity of the country in which they operate. The 
foreign corporations enable a low-income country to 
develop, but they develop because of the capital and 
employment opportunities that the company brings to the 
country. The internal situation of a low-income country 
does play a role in the development of the country, but 
foreign business drives the internal situation (Cardoso 
1973 ) . 
The pessimism of dependency theory of the 1960s and 
1970s was replaced by a famous "dependent development" of 
Evans (1983), in which low-income countries are developing, 
but they are developing because of high-income countries. 
As rioted above, prior research has showed that low-income 
countries are dependent on high-income countries for 
technology and capital. The technology and capital that 
the high-income countries provide to the low-income 
countries facilitate what internal advancements the country 
can pursue. If a high-income country were to withdraw 
support from a low-income country, the low-income country 
would decline. However an increase in support from high-
15 
income countries would increase development in the low-
income country. The low-income countries of the world are 
developing by being dependent on the high-income countries. 
Evans (1983) differed from many other dependency 
theorists because he illustrated how internal conditions 
play a role in development. A triple alliance is formed by 
local, state, and multinational capital. Evans argued that 
multinational corporations are attracted to the markets of 
low-income countries. The state provides incentives, such 
as subsidies and cheap labor, which will attract the 
outside capital necessary to develop the country. 
Meanwhile, the local capital would benefit from the new 
capital flowing into the area and be able to establish a 
niche in the market that would help the area to develop. 
Without the "triple alliance" working together development 
would not be possible. 
Many dependency theorists state that dependency is an 
external condition. As Frank (19 67) and Dos Santos (1971) 
illustrated, low-income countries become dependent on high-
income countries through colonization and the high-income 
countries' control of technology, not through the internal 
resources and capital of the low-income country. The 
theory also demonstrates that dependency is based on 
economic conditions. Low-income countries would not be in 
16 
the position they were in if high-income countries did not 
control the market and the currency of the market. Being 
in a dependent position, many countries have to barrow 
money from the high-income countries and this leads to 
debt. Countries that have high levels of debt have to pay 
down the loan with money they often do not have. 
Therefore, the country borrows more money to keep its 
economy afloat while at the same time paying back the first 
loan; thus, the country becomes more dependent on high-
income countries. 
Critics of dependency theory argue that the theory is 
abstract and, at times, Marxist propaganda that treats all 
low-income countries the same (So 199 0). The theory does 
not take into account internal conditions, such as 
political conditions and mass movements. While dependency 
theory does explain how external and geopolitical factors 
play a role in development, the theory does not explain how 
domestic political decisions shape or hinder the prospects 
for development. 
The theory was developed in Latin America in response 
to modernization theory and the increasing influence of the 
United States. However, as many scholars have noted, many 
Asian countries were also colonies but were able to develop 
more rapidly than Latin American countries. The growth of 
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the Asian Dragons/Tigers (Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Singapore) shows that some countries, despite a high level 
of dependency in the 1950s-1960s, were able to develop 
economically and to expand human capital. By inviting 
multinational corporations into their countries the Asian 
Dragons/Tigers were able to produce jobs and investment 
opportunities that were not available before, and the 
countries developed quickly. Latin American countries, on 
the other hand, received loans to build factories and 
infrastructure. By receiving loans Latin America acquired 
huge levels of debt and slower development. The divergence 
between these Asian countries and Latin American countries 
in their levels of development suggests that dependency 
theory may help us explain only half the development puzzle 
by explaining external factors only. Dependency theory 
needed to adjust by examining internal and external factors 
influencing or hindering development within a world 
economy. 
World-System Theory 
Wallerstein (1979) extended the dependency school by 
developing world-system theory, which states that the world 
is ordered in world economy with core, peripheral, and 
semi-peripheral countries (Wallerstein 1979). The core 
countries are the high-income Western countries, the semi-
18 
peripheral middle-income countries consist mostly of those 
in Eastern Europe (i.e. former Soviet Union, and many South 
American countries), and the low-income peripheral 
countries of the world are located primarily in Africa and 
parts of Central America and Southeast Asia. World-system 
theory directs researchers to examine how core, semi-
peripheral, and peripheral fit within an integrated world-
economy . 
Based on the strength and weakness of the world-
economy core, semiperipheral, and peripheral countries 
could move up or down based on their reaction to the 
current global market. If the global market weakens, a 
core country needs to maintain profits by increasing 
efficiency and gaining a monopoly in the market to stay on 
top. If the core country cannot do gain a monopoly, it may 
fall to the semiperiphery because it cannot maintain its 
profits in an economic downturn. At the same time, when 
the market is weak, semiperipheral and peripheral countries 
can "seize the chance" by buying technology cheaply and 
thus increase their future capital and strength in the 
market (Wallerstein 1974b). 
World-System theory has produced a new global approach 
to studying development. The theory examines how global 
dynamics play a role in development for all nation-states. 
19 
The interaction between the core, periphery, and 
semiperiphery demonstrate that the global economy plays a 
significant role in how countries develop. 
A criticism of world-system theory is that it. does not 
take historically specific development within each nation 
state into account by lumping all countries into a world 
model (Zeitlin 1984). World-system theory fits all 
countries into a world level of analysis, but internal 
factors play a role in development of particular states. 
Because world-system theory is focused on the world level 
the theory does not take class conflict within the country 
into account (Zeitlin 1984). The theory also does not look 
at the production sphere of development to see what role 
the classes play in development. 
Human Capital Theory 
Modernization, dependency, and world-system theories 
illustrate how the internal conditions and external 
conditions of a country are all meaningful in the 
development process. More recent literature has suggested 
that countries can aid their development by strengthening 
institutions that will allow them to compete in the global-
economy. Flora's community capitals model suggests that 
financial, natural, cultural, human, social, political, and 
built capital effect the development of a country (Flora, 
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Emery, Fey, and Bregendahl 2 007). By strengthening each 
area a country will become vibrant and grow. Education is 
one of the factors that the community capital model has 
identified as building human capital, which will attract 
outside investment (financial capital) to assist a country 
to grow. 
Human capital theory builds on the idea that a 
country's internal dynamics and its external relations with 
other countries helps to explain its level of development. 
Abrokwaa (1999:653) stated that "any form of acquired 
skills or knowledge that could be used to improve the 
individual's ability to perform productive work must be 
considered capital investments." Sachs (2 005:244) explains 
human capital as, "health, nutrition, and skills needed for 
each person to be economically productive." Human-capital 
theorists believe that in order for a country to develop 
the people need to acquire skills that will be beneficial 
to promote outside investment. 
As shown by the Asian Dragons/Tigers, countries can 
implement policies and invest"in institutions such as 
education. Multinational corporations will then be 
attracted to the area because of the increase in human 
capital. As more corporations enter the area, more jobs 
will become available. An increase in employment increases 
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the income of the people in the area, which increases the 
standard of living in the area. After the standard of 
living increases the state can tax the population and put 
the tax revenue into social programs such as schools and 
increase human capital further. 
Multinational and transnational corporations seek 
workforces that possess the human capital necessary to 
engage in the manufacturing process. Therefore, it is 
essential for nation states to have a robust primary and 
secondary education system to attract these investors. As 
secondary and primary education expand, the country will 
increase human capital; thus, the workforce of the country 
will be attractive to outside investors that will help the 
country grow. 
After World War II Japan experienced rapid development 
because of their Tokugawa religion (Bellah 1957). Bellah 
found that the Tokugawa religion provided the core value of 
Japanese society. The religion was based on the good of 
the community and the whole, rather than the individual. 
After World War II the samurai of Japan turned themselves 
into entrepreneurs, not for profit but for the good of 
society. By becoming entrepreneurs for the good of society 
Japan was able to industrialize quickly and produce human 
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capital throughout Japan that was able to attract 
investment from high-income countries. 
McClelland (1964) stated that entrepreneurs play a 
critical role in development. According to McClelland, 
entrepreneurs pursue achievement not profit. A low-income 
country can bolster its entrepreneurs by remaining in 
contact with the high-income countries. The diffusion of 
ideas will help entrepreneurs in low-income countries 
create new ideas and technologies that will assist in 
development and build social capital. The expansion of 
technologies and industries that the entrepreneurs will 
provide will increase the human capital in the low-income 
country. 
Bellah's (1957) and McClelland's (1964) research is 
commonly described as part of modernization theory because 
they state that contact with the high-income countries is 
beneficial for development, but these studies also 
highlight the utility of human capital theory. The two 
studies show how internal actions by a low-income country 
can produce human capital through entrepreneurs and how 
external factors, such as investment by high-income 
countries, can help a low-income country to develop. The 
entrepreneurs need to be educated to attract outside 
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investment. Multinational corporations want literate and 
» 
obedient workers that education will provide. 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Barclay (2 004) found that poor 
human capital formation in Africa could explain the 
region's lack of innovation, diffusion, and adaptation of 
new technologies. Oketch (2005) demonstrated that as 
countries develop they put more money into education, which 
increases human development and increases development 
further. By building human capital through education low-
income countries are developing. 
In fact, the Grameen Bank provides microcredit or 
small loans to impoverished communities in the hope that 
human capital and social capital will be produced and raise 
the community out of poverty. The bank lends money to 
women, and these women start a business in their community -
Once the women begin to make a profit, the money is used to 
pay for their children's primary schooling. 
Education has always been shown to have a positive 
effect on development. In his now classic work, Lipset 
(1959:482) believed that low education "predisposed 
individuals to favor extremist, intolerant, and 
transvaluational forms of political and religious 
behavior." Human capital theory states that school 
expansion fosters economic growth (Hage, Gamier, and 
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Fuller 1988). Sachs (2003:8) stated that, "the business 
environment, the social environment, the ecological 
environment, and the country's strategy or lack of strategy 
with regard to science and technology" are four 
interlocking circles that produce economic results. All of 
these culminate in human capital, which is achieved through 
education. 
Education has a greater effect on children from low-
income countries than it does on children living in high-
income countries (Fuller 1987). For many children in low-
income countries school is the first time they are exposed 
to books and socialized in Western values. The children of 
the low-income countries grow and learn rapidly from being 
educated in formal schools and socialized in a world-
economy. By being immersed in a standardized form of 
education children in low-income countries increase the 
human capital of their country that can help the country to 
develop. 
Encouraging people to go to school can help the 
development process as Kenya has shown (Bradshaw and Fuller 
1996). After independence Kenya bolstered her school 
attendance by offering food supplements, reducing the cost 
of school attendance, and expanding secondary school 
opportunities. It was believed that providing these 
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incentives would produce skilled graduates who would fill 
t 
the jobs of the whites who were leaving after Kenya's 
independence. The outcome of this policy failed due to a 
fragile economy in Kenya. The incentives were taken away, 
and Kenya remained a low-income county, but the incentives 
do show that the government plays an important role in 
educational attendance and attainment. 
Governments can provide incentives to encourage school 
attendance, but Brown and Hunter (2004) illustrated that 
the type of government has an effect on education. 
Democracies provide a higher amount of spending on 
education than do other forms of governments (Brown and 
Hunter 2004). Higher levels of educational spending will 
produce higher levels of human capital, thus increasing 
development. Examining different forms of governance can 
explain some of the differences in development among low-
income countries. Development studies need to take the 
type of government into account when studying development. 
African development may be slower due to the agrarian 
structure of many areas. Agrarian societies resist 
democracy according to Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 
(1992). Because the middle class is the driving force of 
democratization, the existence of a small middle class in 
most African countries has contributed to a slower rate of 
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economic growth compared to other regions. Exploring 
government and political systems in Africa needs to be 
examined further to understand the effect that education 
and the role of the government have on each other. 
When explaining sub-Saharan Africa's development 
Gereffi and Fonda (1992) explained that Africa is 
developing slowly because Africa depends on agriculture, 
and agricultural production could not keep pace with the 
increasing population. African industries use minimal 
technology and often employ low-skill workers (Gereffi and 
Fonda 1992). It is important to understand that internal 
as well as external factors drive development. Expanding 
education can increase human capital (Psacharopoluos 1995); 
internal factors will drive whether money is allocated to 
education, but external business or loans may be necessary 
to help a country expand educational spending. 
Position in the global economic system, internal 
colonialism, and the underdevelopment of state structures 
are reasons behind the stratification within Latin America, 
which is the most stratified region in the world (Hoffman 
and Centeno 2003). Africa's stratification can be examined 
in the same way as Latin America's. Understanding that 
Africa is made up of many different groups of people will 
help to explain some of the differences among countries in 
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Africa. Viewing Africa historically and examining internal 
t 
strife, state structures, and global position will help 
explain what effect education has in the development of the 
country. Examining countries' stratification as Hoffman 
and Centeno have done will provide information on whether 
universal education helps decrease stratification within a 
country. 
Examining differences in development between low-
income countries can bring to light some of the factors 
that promote or hinder development. Ramirez and Meyer 
(1980:3 69) state, "research in 'comparative education' 
consists in studies of education in individual countries 
with few direct comparisons." Studying education across 
countries can illuminate the differences in development 
that education affects. By viewing countries historically 
and taking the country's government type, poverty, and 
disease into account a clue to what development strategies 
work and which development strategies fail will emerge. 
By examining three different countries in Africa a 
picture will emerge of what has hindered development in 
Africa. The history of the country will provide a context 
as to why the country is in its current global position. 
Comparisons of each country will help to show that each 
country, while unique, shares similar barriers to 
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development; thus, any educational development will be 
mitigated by the reaction of the government to these 
barriers. 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODS 
As discussed in the previous section, research has 
shown that education has a positive effect on development 
for low-income countries throughout the world. While 
quantitative studies have shown this relationship exists, 
prior research is limited in examining the barriers that 
may hinder, or prevent, education from having this positive 
influence on development. When conducting quantitative 
analyses on countries, researchers lose the context of each 
case, and the historical and geopolitical factors 
influencing development become less of a concern. 
This study initially set out to examine the 
relationship between education and development in a sample 
of African countries using a historical-comparative 
approach. However, in the course of doing the inductive 
work necessary in a historical-comparative project like 
this one, troubling patterns began to emerge. Through this 
historical-comparative data collection, a variety of common 
social problems were identified, which represent 
significant challenges for a large number of developing 
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countries as they pursue increased levels of educational 
attainment and economic growth. 
Given this context, this research will explore and 
identify the barriers to the effects of education on 
economic development in a sample of three African 
countries: Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland. These countries 
were chosen because data were available, each possessed a 
unique colonial legacy with unique political structures 
today, and each country is from a different region on the 
continent of Africa. 
Using a quantitative and qualitative historical 
comparison between the three countries will provide context 
for what role education plays in development. When 
speaking about combining quantitative and qualitative 
research, Booth (2004) states, "one methodology was 
incomplete without the other as they reciprocally 
contribute to better understanding of the other's results" 
(p. xiv). An appreciation of the past is vital to our 
understanding of the present (Booth 2 004) . By using a 
quantitative and qualitative approach and by examining the 
countries historically, this research will provide a rich 
context showing the factors promoting and/or hindering 
development. 
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Historical comparisons employ the use of a case-
oriented approach to the data. As Ragin (1987:35) states 
vcomparativists who use case-oriented strategies often want 
to understand or interpret specific cases because of their 
intrinsic value." The goal behind using a case-oriented 
approach in this research is to interpret historical 
features that led to different or similar paths in the 
development of Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland. 
Exploratory research using historical comparatives is 
conducted in three ways (Wickham-Crowley 1992). One way of 
using a historical comparative is to use successive cases 
to support a theoretical position. Another procedure is 
the use of cases to emphasize the differences. The third 
approach explores the differences and the similarities to 
try to isolate the true cause of an outcome. With the 
current study being exploratory, the third approach was 
used. The countries used in the study have both 
similarities and differences. Any barriers to development 
in the three countries was compared to highlight any 
barriers to the development of the country. 
Comparative historical analysis will be used in this 
study to identify patterns across the three nations that 
led to their current situation. Quantitative research uses 
a variable approach, which provides a snapshot of what is 
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happening at the moment the data we re collected. By-
utilizing historical-comparative qualitative methods, 
researchers can obtain insights into the patterns that 
exist within the quantitative data longitudinally. 
A sequence of events is taken into account in the 
comparative historical approach (Schutt 2004). To 
understand the development of Cameroon, Kenya, and 
Swaziland, this analysis examined past events that led to 
each country's present day status in the global economy. 
For example, if the quantitative data demonstrate that a 
country's educational system is expanding, the hypothesis 
would be that the country's corresponding development 
indicators, such as the Human Development Index and Gross-
National Income per capita are also growing. The 
historical approach allows the researcher to dig further 
into the data and examine what laws, initiatives, social 
programs, social problems, or policies specifically aided 
the country's growing educational system and its subsequent 
development or to help identify the factors intervening in 
this linkage. 
Research has shown that different forms of government 
invest more money in education (Brown and Hunter 2004), and 
different forms of government can produce variation in 
development of entrepreneurs, which affects levels of human 
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capital (Inkeless 1964) . For example, Cameroon has had the 
same president for many years and resembles a one-party 
democracy- Kenya possessed a one-party democracy for many 
years, but in the early 1990s additional political parties 
were allowed to put forth candidates for presidential 
elections. Finally, Swaziland's ruler is a monarch and is 
not chosen by a democratic process. These three countries 
currently have different government structures and unique 
relationships between government and civil society. Using 
these three countries as case studies and by exploring a 
comparative-historical approach, the research examined the 
factors hindering the effects of education on development. 
Moreover, other researchers argue that natural 
resources and climate have a tremendous effect on 
development (Diamond 1999; Sachs 2005). Each country is 
located in a different area of Africa with different 
climates and natural resources. Cameroon is located in 
West Africa, Kenya is in East Africa, and Swaziland is 
located in Southern Africa. A natural disaster may skew 
the data of a country; thus, examining a country's 
ecological history could produce further information on the 
country's development. Countries with significant rainfall 
and good soil may be able to grow crops with minimal labor 
necessary from children, thus allowing them to go to 
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school. In other countries with a more arid climate 
children may be needed for labor and cannot attend school. 
This research will use data from the World Bank from 
1990-2004 for Swaziland, Kenya, and Cameroon in order to 
highlight some recent trends in their educational and 
development indicators. The World Bank is an institution 
made up of 184 member nations and two lending institutions 
--the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). 
The World Bank provides loans and grants to developing 
countries in the aim of reducing global poverty and 
improving living standards in the developing nations. The 
World Bank data are the best available data source for 
development indicators because the World Bank is actively 
involved in this area and studies development indicators in 
order to determine what countries are in need of financial 
support. The World Bank produces a CD-ROM with world 
development indicators from 1960-2004. These data will be 
used to highlight the changes that have taken place in each 
country between 1990 and 2004. 
Scholarly articles, books, news articles, and reports 
from international institutions were used to provide an 
idea of what trends were present in each country. These 
books and articles illustrated what challenges to 
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development are present in each country. After examining 
trends in education, such as educational spending, and 
development indicators, such as health expenditure, in the 
three countries under evaluation, the research will then 
utilize a historical-comparative approach by studying each 
country as a case study. By examining the three countries 
in this manner, the study will be able to illustrate what 
factors helped and what factors hindered the relationship 
between education and development. 
Cases Under Consideration 
In the following section the geography and history of 
each country will be presented to aid in understanding how 
the country developed into its current status. Each 
country has a unique history, but the past will help to 
guide what has hampered development in the present day. 
Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland will then be compared side 
by side to understand what has hindered development. 
The Monarchy: Swaziland 
Swaziland is a small country landlocked between South 
Africa to the west and Mozambique to the east. The country 
has an area of 6,705 square miles and is about the same 
size as Wales (Grotpeter 1975) or slightly smaller than New 
Jersey (U.S. Department of State 2006). The tiny size of 
Swaziland does not denote that the country is of little 
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significance. Swaziland has an abundance of water, fertile 
i 
soil, and mineral resources that have made the country 
wealthy when compared to other sub-Saharan countries (Booth 
2000). 
Economy and Geography. The wealth of the county has, 
however, not flowed evenly throughout the population. The 
monarchy has established a trust called the Tibiyo 
takaNgwane that siphons vast sums of money into an account 
that is accessible to the king and his allies. Moreover, 
the European community is in control of large tracts of 
agricultural land and the manufacturing sector (Booth 
2000). These two groups hold most of the wealth that 
Swaziland has accumulated since independence, leaving the 
majority of the population without access to economic 
resources. 
Swaziland consists of four regions with distinct 
climates, soils, and resources. The U.S. Department of 
State 2 006) lists Swaziland's temperature as temperate to 
tropical. The four regions are parallel to each other 
extending east to west and are called the highveld, the 
middleveld, the lowveld, and the Lubombo plateau. The 
highveld is 6,000 feet to 3,500 feet above sea level and 
has high rainfall (Booth 2000). Swaziland is one of the 
world's leading producers of softwood timber and pulp 
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because commercial forestry is ideal in this region. The 
middleveld is between 3,800 feet and 1,500 feet and has the 
largest population density in the country (Booth 2000). 
Mbabane, the capital of Swaziland with a population of 
6 0,000, is located in the middleveld (U.S. Department of 
State 2006). The area receives plenty of rainfall, and 
cotton, maize, tobacco, pineapples, and rice are grown here 
(Grotpeter 1975). Between 1,000 and 500 feet is the 
lowveld (Booth 2000). The lowveld is used for cattle 
grazing and is the most irrigated region in Swaziland with 
sugar and citrus crops grown in the area. Low rainfall and 
a tropical climate in this region make it susceptible to 
drought, and habitation of this area is complicated by the 
presence of malaria and bilhariza (Booth 2000). The 
Lubombo plateau is similar to the middleveld in climate, 
altitude, and agriculture production. 
The country's land falls into two categories: Swazi 
Nation Land (SNL) and Title Deed Land (TDL). SNL comprises 
60 percent of the country and is held in trust by the king. 
The king allocates the land to chiefs who then allocate the 
land to homestead heads in traditional practices. The SNL 
is communal land and produces subsistence crops and cattle. 
TDL consists of 40 percent of the nation and is held by 
Swazis and Europeans. The deeds to this land date back to 
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1907 and produce nearly all of Swaziland's market crops and 
i 
timber production. Most estates in the TDL are owned by 
foreign capital, while the monarchy controls the rest 
through the king's Tibiyo takaNgwane fund. 
The service sector, especially tourism, represents 
32.6 percent of Swaziland's national income, with 
agriculture/forestry and manufacturing comprising an 
additional 21.4 percent and 20.1 percent respectively 
(U.S. State Department 2006). The figures are misleading 
because the king's Tibyo takaNgwane fund is not included as 
part of Swaziland's income. The amount of money generated 
by the fund is secret, and only the king and his close 
allies know how much the fund is worth. 
Political History. Between 1996 and 2006 a new 
constitution was being drafted in this small nation. The 
Ngwenyama (king) Mswati III believed that this new 
constitution was a step in the right direction for his 
kingdom because the constitution is based on culture and 
tradition (Kagwanja 2006). The king may have believed that 
the constitution was a solid step in the right direction, 
but he had opponents who claimed that the king's Dlamini 
clan was using tradition as a way to maintain a 
stranglehold on power. To understand the events that led 
to the new constitution and the opponents of it we must 
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understand what development occurred in Swaziland before it 
gained independence in 1968. 
The earliest Swazi people (the Bembo-Nguni) settled in 
Lubombo, present day Mozambique (Grotpeter 1975) . Unable 
to deal with the strength of the Zulu tribe the king Ngwane 
III moved his people to what is now modern day Swaziland in 
1750. The people of Swaziland are referred to today as 
"kaNgwane (land of Ngwane) and bakaNgwane (people of 
Ngwane)" (Grotpeter 1975:116). The Zulu raids continued to 
disrupt Swazi life, and in 183 6 King Mswati II rose to the 
throne and took action to prevent further attacks. Mswati 
II is known as, "the greatest of the Swazi fighting kings" 
(Grotpeter 1975:109). Swaziland's name was received from 
the Europeans' poor pronunciation of Mswati. 
Mswati II consolidated tribes in the north and west of 
modern South Africa into Swaziland. He also played the 
role of a diplomat to help defeat the Zulus. Mswati II 
urged the British in South Africa to help in dealing with 
the Zulu raids. In exchange for help dealing with the 
threat, Mswati II allowed missionaries to settle along 
Swaziland's borders (Booth 2000). Land was also given to 
the British to aid in ridding Swaziland of the Zulus, which 
led to the colonization of Swaziland after Mswati's death 
in 1868. 
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Swaziland was not colonized immediately after the 
death of the Ngwenyama. Two successive kings came to power 
but proved to be weak and unable to deal with the growing 
influence of the Boers. Political infighting made the 
determination of the next king of Swaziland unclear, but in 
1875 Mbandzeni Dlamini IV took the throne (Grotpeter 1975). 
The unclear legitimacy of his reign as Ngwenyama .led 
Dlamini IV to look to the British to aid him in staying in 
power. He granted land, grazing, and monopoly rights to 
the British and to the South African Republic. After his 
death in 1889 Bhunu Dlamini V ascended to the throne, but 
his rule was short lived. Bhunu Dlamini V died four years 
later in 1899. 
The death of the Ngwenyama left the next king of 
Swaziland in doubt, and in 19 02 the British took over the 
administration of Swaziland (Potholm 1972). The Ndlovukazi 
(queen) Labotsibeni gained control of the weakened monarchy 
because Bhunu V's son, Sobhuza II, was only a child. The 
queen proved to be highly effective in holding the monarchy 
together and won allies in the south and east. In 1921 
Sobhuza II took the monarchy from his mother and proved to 
be as effective as his mother in holding the crown 
together. 
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Sobhuza's effectiveness may be due to his education in 
western schools, in which he had a secondary education at 
Lovedale Missionary Institution in Cape Town (Booth 2004). 
The influence of Western values was evident from his dress 
and choice of advisors. He placed great importance on 
modern day education, which he believed would help his 
country become modern. A British commissioner agreed with 
Sobhuza saying that a national school would, "in time prove 
itself to be the most important factor in the civilization 
of the Swazi nation" (Booth 2004:34). The schools of the 
time were not of the same quality as those of the Europeans 
(Booth 2004) so Sobhuza believed a Swazi school needed to 
be created. In 1931 Sobhuza started an independently 
controlled Swazi school at Matsapha in the hope that 
education would lead to modernization. 
As the years passed, it became evident to Sobhuza II 
and the British that independence was inevitable. The 
British announced that elections would be held in 1964 to 
aid in the transition to independence. Afraid of losing 
power in free elections, Sobhuza II started his own 
political party called the Imbokodvo National Movement 
(INM). The INM aligned itself with the United Swaziland 
Association (USA) a European-based political party. The two 
parties swept the election (Potholm 1972), and this newly 
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elected government was in charge of drafting the 
independence constitution of Swaziland. Sobhuza II broke 
off his alliance with the USA, and the party quickly found 
itself obsolete because at the same time Sobhuza co-opted 
the top political leaders in Swaziland. With no political 
opposition left in Swaziland, Sobhuza II placed the 
monarchy at the forefront of an independent Swaziland 
(Booth 2000) . 
The parliamentary system that was set up permitted 
Sobhuza II to nominate 6 of the 3 0 members of the assembly. 
The rest of the members were to be elected from eight 
three-member constituencies, which were from rural areas 
that were controlled by Sobhuza (Booth 2000). A 12-member 
senate was established in which Sobhuza II was to nominate 
half of the members, and the prime minister and the chief 
justice of Swaziland were appointed by the king. The king 
also was able to gain control of the mines that the British 
had held. Sobhuza set up a trust called the Tibiyo 
takaNgwane (Wealth of the Swazi Nation) with the wealth 
that the mines bestowed. The trust provided a large amount 
of capital for the monarchy to secure its position in the 
future. 
Britain granted Swaziland independence on September 6, 
1968 and Sobhuza continued to dominate the political 
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process until 1972. In the elections of 1972 a rival 
political party, the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress 
(NNLC), won three seats in parliament. Sobhuza declared an 
emergency in 1973, saying there was a procedural problem in 
the elections and revoked the constitution and outlawed 
political parties (Matlosa 1998). The Royal Umbutfo 
Defense Force was created and stocked with men loyal to 
Sobhuza. The army ruled for the next five years until the 
new parliament was selected. In the new parliament the 
king selected the candidates and then open voting was held 
(Booth 2000). 
Sobhuza's grip on power was now complete, and he ruled 
this way until his death from heart failure in 1982 
(Matlosa 1998). His death was sudden, and there is 
speculation that he was murdered. With his sudden death 
came a period of uncertainty in Swaziland (Booth 2000). 
Sobhuza did not name his successor before his death but did 
put the queen and the Liqoqo in charge until a new 
successor would be named. The Liqoqo is a council that 
gives the king advice on matters that need his attention 
(Groptpeter 1975). A power struggle took place that pitted 
the members of the Liqoqo against people loyal to the royal 
family. Eventually in 1986 Sobhuza's son ascended to the 
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throne. Mswati III became the king of Swaziland and 
immediately experienced political unrest. 
Many of the members of the Liqoqo were imprisoned or 
forced into exile, and at the same time South Africa began 
to move toward a democratic system. The people of 
Swaziland viewed the change in South Africa as a potential 
for change in Swaziland. The monarchy began to be viewed 
as authoritarian, and the people of Swaziland demanded a 
change (Booth 2000). After fighting to retain the 
monarchy, Mswati III agreed to draft a new constitution and 
established the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) in 
1996. Mswati agreed to ratify the new constitution after 
many years of arguing and bargaining on June 26, 2 005 
(Kagwanja 2006). The new 164-page constitution left the 
monarchy intact and did not include a popular vote. 
Statistics on Education and Development. As the 
discussion in the previous two sections showed, Swaziland 
has had a distinct and unique history. The country 
possesses farmland and a large tourist industry, which have 
developed over the last several decades under the 
leadership of various monarchies. While many African 
countries experimented with democracies, authoritarian 
regimes, and/or one party states, Swaziland maintained its 
monarchy-led government following its independence from 
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Britain. This history provides an important and necessary 
context when examining the effects of education on 
development in Swaziland. 
Table 1 provides some basic education and development 
indicators for Swaziland between 1990 and 2004. As has been 
noted previously, these data were culled from the World 
Bank Development Indicators for the years 1990, 1995, 2000 
and the most recent year available 2004. It is unfortunate 
that, due to missing and/or incomplete data, the World Bank 
Development Indicators do not contain data over consistent 
periods of time for the years preceding 1990. 
Table 1: World Bank Data on Swaziland -1990-2004 - Key Variables 
Development Indicators 1990 1995 2000 2004 
GDP per capita, PPP 3,919 4,131 4,681 5,182 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 56.64 57.64 45.44 42.21 
Life expectancy at birth, male (years) 54.40 55.40 45.03 42.60 
Life expectancy at birth, female (years) 59.00 60.00 45.87 41.80 
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 78.00 78.00 98.00 107.60 
Mortality rate, adult female 196.49 — — — 
Mortality rate, adult male 259.71 — — — 
Health expenditure, total (% of GDP) „ - — 6.10 5.8A 
Hospital beds (per 1,000 people) — — — — 
Physicians (per 1,000 people) 0.11 0.15# 0.18 0.16 
External debt, total (DOD, current US$, in Millions) 298 290 288 470 
Total debt service 5.67 1.77 2.60 1.70 
Aid per capita (current US$) 70.12 64.56 12.62 104.07 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows 3.40 3.81 6.55 2.86 
Foreign direct investment, net outflows 0.86 1.51 1.24 0.15 
Population ages 0-14 (% of total) 47.14 46.35 43.85 41.56 
Population growth (annual %) 3.13 3.11 2.47 1.29 
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Table 1: World Bank Data on Swaziland -1990-2004 - Key Variables (cont.) 
Development Indicators 1990 1995 2000 2004 , 
Urban population (% of total) 22.91 23.05 23.19 23.73 
Education Variables 
Public spending on education (% of GDP) 5.83# — 6.20 6.24 
Expenditure per student, primary 7.64# — 10.52 10.99A 
Expenditure per student, secondary — — 28.67 47.45A 
Expenditure per student, tertiary — — 491.73 260.52 
School enrollment, primary (% net) 74.70# . . . 76.06 76.68A 
School enrollment, secondary (% net) 30.14# . . . 30.55 28.96A 
Primary completion rate, female 64.81 63.66 65.93 64.22A 
Primary completion rate, male 60.83 59.26 62.72 58.30A 
Primary completion rate, total 61.26 61.46 64.32 61.25A 
Primary education, pupils (% female) — — 48.39 48.48A 
Persistence to grade 5, total (% of cohort) 77.04# — 73.86 . . . 
Ratio of female to male primary enrollment 0.99# — 0.94 0.95A 
Ratio of female to male secondary enrollment 0.96# — 1.00 1.01A 
Ratio of female to male enrollments in tertiary education 0.76# . . . 0.89 1.16A 
Pupil-teacher ratio, primary 32.34# — 31.28 31.20A 
Literacy rate, adult female 69.89 . . . — 78.35 
Literacy rate, adult male 73.66 . . . — 80.90 
Literacy rate, adult total 71.62 — . . . 79.56 
Literacy rate, youth total 85.10 — — 88.42 
A
 = one year less 
# = for one year more 
The development indicators from Table 1 provide a 
mixed message on the development of Swaziland. The gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita of Swaziland has 
increased from $3,919 (USD) in 1990 to $5,812 (USD) in 
2004, a 48.5 percent increase in the fourteen-year period. 
While the GDP of Swaziland has increased, Swaziland's 
life expectancy has decreased from 56.64 years in 1990 to 
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42.21 years over the same time period of 1990-2004. Males 
are expected to live almost a year longer than females 
based on data from 2004. Given these trends it is also not 
surprising that infant mortality has increased dramatically 
from 78.00 per 1,000 in 1990 to 107.60 per 1,000 in 2004. 
As the country's life expectancy is decreasing, Swaziland's 
health expenditure has also decreased from 6.1 percent of 
GDP in 2 00 0 to 5.8 percent of GDP in 2 0 05. The number of 
physicians per 1,000 people has also decreased slightly 
from 0.18 in 2000 to 0.16 in 2004. All of these trends have 
contributed to the decline in population growth from 3.13 
percent in 1990 to 1.29 percent in 2004. 
The decrease in life expectancy has caught the 
attention of the world with aid per capita increasing from 
approximately $70.00 in 1990 to $104.07 dollars in 2004. 
Per capita aid was as low as $12.00 million in 2000. Over 
this same period of time, external debt has skyrocketed, 
from $298 million in 1990 to $470 million in 2004. Foreign 
direct investment has dramatically decreased from 2000-
2 004, with net inflows falling from 6.55 percent to 2.86 
percent of GDP and net outflows falling from 1.24 percent 
to 0.15 percent of GDP in the same period. 
Based on these data, it would seem that Swaziland has 
not fared well over the last decade. How have educational 
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spending and other education-related measures fared over 
the same time period? Educational indicators in Swaziland 
show the same mixed message as development indicators. 
Public spending on education has increased as a percentage 
of GDP from 5.83 percent in 1991 to 6.24 percent in 2004. 
Primary school expenditure per student increased from 7.64 
percent in 1991 to 10.99 percent of GDP in 2004. Between 
2 000 and 2 003 secondary expenditure per student went from 
28.67 percent to 47.45 percent of GDP. Literacy rates in 
Swaziland have also improved from 71.62 percent in 1990 to 
79.56 percent in 2004. Primary school enrollment has 
increased from 74.70 percent in 1991 to 76.68 percent in 
2003 . 
Despite these trends, problems do exist in Swaziland's 
educational system. Primary completion has fallen from 
64.32 percent in 2000 to 58.30 percent in 2003. Males and 
females have both experienced a drop in primary-school 
completion. Persistence to Grade 5 has decreased from 
77.04 percent in 1991 to 73.86 percent in 2000. On a 
positive note Swaziland's pupil to teacher ratio has fallen 
from 32.34 in 1991 to 31.20 in 2003. 
The Unitary State: Cameroon 
Cameroon is a triangular shaped country located in 
Western Africa on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. The 
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country has an area of 469,440 square miles and is slightly 
larger than California (CIA World Factbook 2007). Unlike 
other sub-Saharan countries, Cameroon has been politically 
stable for much of its history. However, the recent 
discovery of oil and a continuing feud with Nigeria may 
upset the stability of this country in the future. As Gros 
notes (2003:21), "Cameroon is one of the most ethnically 
plural countries in Black Africa; further, it is the only 
one with three colonial legacies, two of which continue to 
shape politics." In fact, Cameroon has over 250 ethnic 
groups living within the borders (Gros 2003:xv). Tension 
within Cameroon can be traced to its colonial history. 
Germany, France, and Great Britain all claimed Cameroon as 
a colony, which led to many different identities within 
Cameroon. 
Economy and Geography. The discovery of oil has 
promoted an increase in economic investment, but the 
government has kept the revenue from the sale of the 
natural resource a "state secret," and it is not clear what 
the profits from the oil industry fund (DeLancey and 
DeLancey 2 000). Also, ethnic groups argue that the oil is 
on their land and is their property (DeLancey and DeLancey 
2000). Border disputes with Nigeria also make offshore 
drilling a problem for the country. The uncertainty of oil 
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ownership has negated any economic incentives that it might 
have brought to the country. 
Cameroon has three ecological zones covering the area: 
the Sahel to the north, rainforest to the east, and 
volcanic mountains and high grasslands to the west (Gros 
2 0 03). Mount Cameroon is located in the west and is the 
highest point in Western Africa, reaching a height of 
13,435 feet (New Encyclopedia Britannica 2007). The 
country lies in the tropics and possesses a hot and humid 
climate all year long with an average temperature of 82 
degrees Fahrenheit, with daytime temperatures reaching as 
high as 120 degrees Fahrenheit (World Book 2000). 
According to UNICEF (2005a:l), "the north and the far-north 
are particularly dry." The country is agrarian where 80 
percent, "live in rural areas where they engage in 
subsistence and cash-crop farming" (Robinson 1990:53). 
Cameroon's economy is largely based on cocoa, coffee, 
aluminum production, and oil. 
The country falls into two categories: Anglophone, 
and Francophone. Francophone Cameroon contains the 
majority of the population in the country, and government 
positions are overwhelmingly given to Cameroonians of 
French descent. Anglophone Cameroon may be smaller in 
size, population and area, but Cameroon's oil is located in 
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the Anglophone regions. Many Cameroonians of English 
descent believe that oil revenues are being used to help 
Francophone people and not to help their own Anglophone 
population (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997) . The perceived 
belief that oil was not benefiting Anglo Cameroonians has 
led to an increase in hostility between the two groups. 
Political History. Cameroon "seems well on the way to 
becoming one of contemporary Africa's more successful 
political systems" (Le Vine 1971:xix). While Cameroon has 
been politically stable since independence, the country, 
like many in Sub-Saharan Africa, has not achieved the 
promise that many researchers predicted in the early post-
colonial years. Ethnic tension continues to plague the 
country, and the government resembles a one-party unitary 
state, not the multi-party democracy that many leaders in 
Cameroon claim. 
The U.S. Department of State (1999) explains that the 
first people to inhabit Cameroon were the Bakas (Pygmies), 
and the Bakas remain in remote parts of Cameroon to the 
present day. In the 1770s the Fulani, a pastoral Islamic 
people of western Sahel, moved into northern Cameroon and 
conquered the area (U.S. Department of ... 1999). 
Information is scarce regarding this earlier period, and 
much of what is known about present day Cameroon comes from 
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the first European inhabitants in 1472 . The Portuguese 
were the first to explore the country by sailing up the Rio 
dos Camaroes (River of Prawns), or present day Wouri River 
(Gros 2003). The leader of the expedition, Fernando do Po, 
named Cameroon after the abundance of prawns, which are 
actually a variety of crayfish, in the river. The port was 
used as a slave-trade center for the next three centuries. 
Sentiment for the slave trade began to turn in the 
early nineteenth century. Around this time the British 
explored most of inland areas of Cameroon, and other 
European countries began to see the area as a potential 
colony. Great Britain, France, and Germany were scrambling 
for land in Africa, and all three believed Cameroon would 
be a valuable possession. Germany won the Cameroon prize 
by signing treaties with King Akwa and King Bell on July 
12, 1884, which officially made Cameroon a protectorate of 
Germany (Le Vine 1971). In 1911 Germany acquired land in 
the north and the following year made a deal with France to 
acquire land in the south from the Congo, thus doubling the 
size of the territory (Le Vine 1971). Germany's colonial 
heritage in Cameroon is believed to be the "good old days" 
by the people of Cameroon (Gros 2003:4) even though they 
used forced African labor to build the country. Cameroon 
was never fully colonized by Germany and was used as a 
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source of agricultural goods produced using large 
i 
commercial plantations with a sizeable infrastructure. 
France and Britain would obtain control of Cameroon 
after Germany's loss in World War I. Cameroon was split 
into two areas, with France receiving the largest share of 
the land. Great Britain "accepted two noncontiguous 
portions in the west bordering Nigeria that amounted to 
about one-fifth of the territory's total area" (Le Vine 
1971:7) . The split of the country led to an Anglophone 
Cameroon and a Francophone Cameroon, which division 
continues to have ramifications today. France quickly made 
Cameroon a colony, while Great Britain paid little 
attention to Cameroon with the much bigger and richer 
Nigeria next door. Great Britain allowed the north and 
south territories of Cameroon to be administered by 
Nigeria. France invested $80 million in East Cameroon from 
1947 to 1953, a sum that was greater than France spent on 
their colonies of Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, and 
Oubangui-Chari (Central African Republic) combined (Gros 
2003) . 
Thoughts of self-rule and independence swept through 
Africa in the 1950s, and Cameroon was no different. 
Feeling pressure from growing protest movements, France 
granted East Cameroon independence on January 1, 19 60 (Le 
Vine 1971) . The British controlled North and South were to 
hold separate plebiscites at the recommendation of the 
United Nations General Assembly to determine their future. 
On February 11, 19 61 South Cameroon voted overwhelmingly to 
join Cameroon, but North Cameroon voted to join Nigeria (Le 
Vine 1971) . Finally, in October 1961 East and South 
Cameroon were joined to form the modern Cameroon Federal 
Republic. 
The prime minister at the time of independence, 
Ahmandou Ahidjo, was named president of Cameroon. Ahidjo 
seemed an unlikely leader and was seen as a "second-rank 
politician, someone who could easily be manipulated, blamed 
if things went badly and then replaced without second 
thoughts" (Le Vine 2003:38). The facts of Ahidjo's 
upbringing are unclear and debates continue as to what his 
early life was like (Le Vine 2003). Acquaintances of 
Ahidjo described him as illiterate and ridiculed his lack 
of education. The initial impression of Ahidjo proved to 
be quite wrong. Ahidjo held on to power for the next 22 
years, often resorting to authoritarian methods to hold 
power, such as "heavy-handed police operations, physical 
assault on opponents, imprisonment without trial, extra 
judicial punishments including torture and death" (Le Vine 
2003:44). 
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From the first day of independence Ahidjo wanted to 
i 
establish a strong centralized government, which was 
lacking in the federal system that Cameroon had established 
at independence. Under the federal system, power was 
divided among a federal president, vice president, 
ministers, a national assembly, and judiciary (Ngenge 
2003). On September 1, 1966 Ahidjo imposed a one-party 
system in Cameroon, and in May of 19 68 placed Solomon 
Tandeng Muna in the post of prime minister of West 
(Anglophone) Cameroon, replacing the opposition party's 
candidate A.N. Jua. In 1970 Ahidjo selected Muna as his 
running mate in the presidential election, which made Muna 
prime minister of West Cameroon and vice president of the 
federal republic. Ahidjo claimed that the federal system 
threatened national harmony, and on June 2, 1972 decreed 
that Cameroon was a unitary state named the United Republic 
of Cameroon (Ngenge 2 003). 
Ahidjo continued to rule as president of a one-party 
unitary state until November 6, 1982 when he resigned the 
presidency to Paul Biya. It is not clear why Ahidjo 
decided to step down in 1982, but Biya was his handpicked 
successor. It is believed that Ahidjo thought that Biya 
would be weak, and this weakness would allow Ahidjo to rule 
from behind the scenes. 
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Ahidjo to all intents and purposes, had created Biya, 
and probably could not imagine that Biya the disciple 
would, or could, cross his master, nor probably, was 
it any consolation to Ahidjo that Biya had well and 
truly learned from his example. (Le Vine 2003:37) 
Biya quickly proved his skeptics wrong about being weak, 
much like Ahidjo had done decades earlier. Ahidjo in 1983 
apparently admitted that he thought Biya could be easily 
manipulated only to discover that Biya was not who he 
thought Biya to be (Le Vine 2 003) . 
In 1983 there was an attempted coup, which Biya blamed 
on Ahidjo. Ahidjo was exiled to Senegal, where he died of 
a heart attack on November 30, 1989 (Le Vine 2003) . Biya 
renamed Cameroon the Republic of Cameroon, which angered 
the Anglophone minority because the Republic of Cameroon is 
what Ahidjo named Cameroon before the reunification of 
South Cameroon after independence (Konings and Nyamnjoh 
1997). In the 1980s Biya's ethnic group, "appeared to be 
much bolder in staking out claims on the state's resources 
than had Ahidjo's barons" (Konings and Nyamnjoh 19 97:213) . 
In addition to the corruption of Biya's regime an 
economic crisis hit Cameroon with the falling cocoa and 
coffee prices. The economic downturn, which Anglophones 
believed was due to the "corruption and mismanagement of 
Biya's regime," led to political unrest (Konings and 
Nyamnjoh 1997:214). Under pressure Biya agreed to allow 
opposition parties in December of 1990. Elections were 
held in 1992 in which Biya was re-elected, but many in 
Anglophone Cameroon believed that Biya stole the election 
from Fru Nidi. Violent protest erupted over the outcome 
and Biya placed the province under a state of emergency for 
three months and kept Nidi under house arrest. The 
following election in 1997 was widely boycotted by 
opposition parties and Biya won easily. Today Biya 
continues to rule the Republic of Cameroon. 
Statistics on Education and Development. Table 2 
provides some basic education and development indicators 
for Cameroon between 1990 and 2004. The data for Table 2 
were taken from the World Bank Development indicators for 
the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2004. It is unfortunate 
that some of the data are incomplete; thus, the data are 
not consistent for the time period before 1990. 
Table 2: World Bank Data on Cameroon -1990-2004 - Key Variables 
Development Indicators 
GDP per capita, PPP 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
Life expectancy at birth, male (years) 
Life expectancy at birth, female (years) 
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 
Mortality rate, adult female 
Mortality rate, adult male 
Health expenditure, total (% of GDP) 
Hospital beds (per 1,000 people) 
1990 1995 2000 2004 
2,042 1,666 1,882 1,997 
52.40 50.05 46.97 45.98 
50.75 48.50 45.97 45.38 
54.14 51.68 48.01 46.60 
85.00 89.00 88.00 87.20 
361.21 -
430.39 
4.40 4.2A 
2.55 
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Table 2: World Bank Data on Cameroon -1990-2004 - Key Variables (cont.) 
Development Indicators 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Physicians (per 1,000 people) 0.08 0.07# . . . 0.19 
External debt, total (DOD, current US$, in Millions) 666 942 929 949 
Total debt service 20.45 20.84 . . . . . . 
Aid per capita (current US$) 38.25 33.37 25.57 47.48 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows -1.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 
Foreign direct investment, net outflows 0.14 0.01 . . . — 
Population ages 0-14 (% of total) 45.01 44.33 42.86 41.59 
Population growth (annual %) 2.87 2.48 2.06 1.82 
Urban population (% of total) 40.29 44.73 48.98 52.15 
Education Variables 
Public spending on education (% of GDP) 3.22# — 2.36 3.82 
Expenditure per student, primary — — 8.54A . . . 
Expenditure per student, secondary — — 18.64A . . . 
Expenditure per student, tertiary — . . . 71.34A 75.72 
School enrollment, primary (% net) 73.61# . . . . . . . . . 
School enrollment, secondary (% net) — . . . . . . . . . 
Primary completion rate, female 54.79 . . . 49.55 57.58 
Primary completion rate, male 59.03 . . . 56.92 68.89 
Primary completion rate, total 56.92 . . . 53.26 63.26 
Primary education, pupils (% female) — . . . 45.74 45.73 
Persistence to grade 5, total (% of cohort) — . . . 80.73A — 
Ratio of female to male primary enrollment 0.86# . . . 0.85 0.85 
Ratio of female to male secondary enrollment 0.71# . . . 0.80# 0.91 
Ratio of female to male enrollments in tertiary education — . . . . . . 0.64 
Pupil-teacher ratio, primary 51.11# . . . 51.86 52.60 
Literacy rate, adult female 47.53 . . . . . . 59.80 
Literacy rate, adult male 68.65 . . . . . . 77.00 
Literacy rate, adult total 57.88 . . . . . . 67.90 
Literacy rate, youth total 81.14 . . . 
A
 = one year less 
# = for one year more 
The development indicators for Cameroon in Table 2 
show a country that is deteriorating. The GDP per capita 
has fallen from $2,042 (USD) in 1990 to $1,997 (USD) in 
2004. From 1990 to 1995 there was a decline in GDP, and 
from 1995 to 2004 the GDP has been increasing, but it has 
not regained the 1990 level. This slow growth is 
especially troubling when one considers that global GDP 
increases between 1 and 3 percent each year; Cameroon has 
missed out on all of this growth over the last decade and 
half. Life expectancy has also declined from 1990 to 2004 
Cameroon has experienced a decline of 6.42 years in life 
expectancy over this time period, from 50.40 years in 1990 
to 45.98 years in 2004. Coupled with the decline in life 
expectancy, health expenditure has also declined. Health 
expenditure has decreased from 4.4 percent of GDP in 2000 
to 4.2 percent of GDP in 2 003. With a decreasing life 
expectancy and a reduction in health expenditure the 
population growth of Cameroon has decreased from 2.87 
percent in 1990 to 1.82 percent in 2004. 
External debt has increased from 1990 to 2004; this 
fact may explain the decline in health expenditure. The 
debt rose from $666 million in 1990 to $949 million in 
2004, thus also increasing Cameroon's debt service. The 
data do not show the debt service in 2000 or 2004, but the 
debt service did increase between 1990 and 1995. At the 
same time foreign direct investment in Cameroon has 
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decreased. Net inflows are 0 and net outflows are 0.01, or 
nonexistent. The one positive development indicator for 
Cameroon is that aid per capita has increased from $38.25 
million in 1990 to $47.48 million in 2004. Aid decreased 
from 1990 to 2000, but in 2004 there was a significant 
increase in aid to Cameroon. 
The education indicators for Cameroon paint a more 
favorable picture of the country. Public spending on 
education increased from 3.22 percent GDP in 1991 to 3.82 
percent GDP in 2004, but spending decreased from 1991 to 
1999. The increased educational expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP is likely the result of the stagnant 
economy, which has not witnessed any measurable growth over 
the last 15 years. In this environment educational 
expenditures could decline but still register as being 
higher as a percentage of GDP. Cameroon's primary 
expenditure per student is only available for 1999, but 
when compared to Kenya and Swaziland, Cameroon's 
expenditure is the lowest of the three countries. Cameroon 
spent 8.54 percent of GDP per capita in 1999 on primary 
education, while Swaziland spent 9.45 percent of GDP per 
capita in 1999, and Kenya spent 27.64 percent of GDP per 
capita in 2000. 
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Primary completion rates have increased from 1990 to 
2004 for males and females. The total primary completion 
rate increased from 56.92 percent in 1990 to 63.26 percent 
in 2004. Persistence to grade five is higher than 
Swaziland's at 80.73 percent in 1999 and 73.86 percent in 
2000 respectively. The pupil-teacher ration has increased 
from 51.11 in 1991 to 52.60 in 2004. Cameroon's literacy 
rate has increased from 57.88 percent in 1990 to 67.90 
percent in 2 004. 
The Multi-party State: Kenya 
Kenya is located in Eastern Africa and borders 
Ethiopia to the north, Somalia and the Indian Ocean to the 
east, Tanzania to the south, Uganda to the west, and Sudan 
to the northwest. The country has an area of 582,646 
square miles (approximately the size of Texas) (U.S. 
Department of State 2007). Archaeologists believe that 
Kenya was the "cradle of mankind" because the country was 
home to the earliest humanoids (Maxon and Ofcansky 2000:1). 
Economy and Geography. There are several 
topographical regions within Kenya. The low coastal plains 
have a humid and wet environment with annual rainfall 
amounts ranging from 47 inches to 2 6 inches (Maxon and 
Ofcansky 2000). The coastal plateau gives way to a series 
of low plateaus that cover the entire northern half of the 
nation and stretch down to the border with Tanzania. The 
low plateaus are the driest regions of Kenya with rainfall 
amounts below 2 0 inches a year. West of the lowland 
plateaus is the highlands, which is a series of volcanic 
mountains. The highest mountain in the country, Mount 
Kenya, stands at 17,057 feet. The highlands give way to 
the Rift Valley, which is a massive depression that is 31 -
41 miles wide. 
The climate of Kenya is tropical in the south, west, 
and central regions, and arid in the north and northeast 
(U.S. Department of State 2007). This climate is a 
critical influence in Kenya's position today. The country 
is prone to drought and "only 11 percent is suitable for 
agriculture" (Maxon and Ofcansky 2000:3) . Almost all of 
the agricultural land is located in the south. The 
northern area of Kenya is mostly desert or semidesert. 
When Kenya experiences drought, the consequences are 
tragic, with so little of the country able to produce food 
for the 34 million people in the country (U.S. Department 
of State 2007) . 
A severe drought struck Kenya from 1999 - 2000, but 
corruption in Kenya's government has hampered any effort to 
aid Kenya through the drought. The IMF suspended loans to 
Kenya in 1997 but resumed these loans in 2000 to aid 
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drought victims. When the government failed to take on 
corruption, the IMF halted loans to Kenya again in 2 001 
(CIA World Factbook 2007). 
Kenya's economy is largely based on agriculture. 
There are some small-scale industries, such as textiles, 
but Kenya's main economic activities are based on tea, 
coffee, corn, wheat, sugarcane, dairy products, beef, pork, 
poultry, and eggs (CIA World Factbook 2007) . Tourism also 
plays a major role in Kenya's economy. Because poaching 
and the hunting of wildlife are illegal in Kenya, tourists 
throughout the world flock to Kenya's national wildlife 
parks to view indigenous African wildlife. 
Along with being known as the birthplace of mankind, 
Kenya has been known as, "one of the most important 
business, cultural, diplomatic, and political centers in 
Africa" (Maxon and Ofcansky 2 000:1). The African 
population of Kenya is divided into more than 4 0 ethnic 
groups, which speak primarily three languages: Bantu, 
Cushitic, and Nilotic. Local dialects then split these 
three languages further. The official languages of Kenya 
are English and Swahili, thus making Kenyans with some 
primarily and/or secondary schooling trilingual. 
Political History. From the 1960s until the 1990s 
Kenya was primarily a one-party nation state, with the 
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Kenya African National Union party (KANU) holding power 
i 
during this time period. On December 2, 1992 President 
Moi, a member of KANU, unexpectedly announced he would 
allow multi-party elections in Kenya. Optimism and 
excitement spread throughout Kenya over the chance of free 
and fair elections. However, recently the optimism and 
excitement over a democratic state have vanished. Kenya 
has fallen from one of the West's favorite African 
countries to "pariah status" (Meredith 2005:403). 
According to the BBC News (2007a) the "initial joy has been 
replaced by anger and resentment" (p. 1), and "Western 
goodwill has also dissipated as hopes that Kenya would be 
an example of good governance in the East African region 
have been dashed" (p. 1). 
Kenya has a long history of human existence. 
According to the U.S. Department of State (2007) fossils 
suggest that protohumans were in the area more than 2 0 
million years ago. The Koobi Fora near Lake Turkana had 
hominid habitation 2.5 million years ago (Maxon and 
Ofcansky 2000). 
Arab traders began exploring the coast of Kenya in the 
fist century A.D. and began establishing settlements in the 
eighth century. The Portuguese where the first Europeans 
to explore Kenya, trying to obtain control of the area in 
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the sixteenth century. Swahili and Omani Arabs were able 
to drive the Portuguese out in the late seventeenth century 
(BBC News 2007b). It was not until 1895 that the British 
made Kenya an East African Protectorate, although the north 
was not brought under British control until after World War 
I. 
Britain became interested in Kenya because it wanted 
to build a railroad from Mombasa to Lake Victoria. The 
railroad had a huge impact on Kenya's development as the 
British government encouraged European farmers to settle 
the area to help pay for the railway (Maxon and Ofcansky 
2000). Europeans settled in the highlands and established 
plantations and ranches, which became known as the White 
Highlands. Britain raised taxes and used coercive 
measures, such as state labor control policies and low 
wages, to force locals to work on settler farms. 
Protests sprung up against the Europeans after World 
War I, but it was following World War II that the 
protesters began to demand self-governance and independence 
(Maxon and Ofcansky 2000). In 1944 a colony wide political 
party was formed called the Kenya African Union (KAU), 
which demanded self-reliance. Little progress was made 
until October 1952 when Britain arrested Jomo Kenyatta, the 
head of KAU, and many followers. Britain convicted 
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Kenyatta and banned KAU in order to stop the increasing 
( 
militancy and violence, but this increasing militancy and 
violence had the opposite effect. 
The actions taken by Britain sparked the Mau Mau 
rebellion. According to Meredith (2005), "no other revolt 
against British rule in Africa gained such notoriety as the 
Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya" (p. 79) . A guerrilla war was 
fought by thousands of Kenyans against the British. The 
rebels were mostly from the Kikuyu who were some of the 
poorest people in the country, and Europeans believed that 
Kenyatta was responsible for the rebellion. Whites viewed 
Kenyatta suspiciously and "no other figure in colonial 
Africa was so reviled" (Meredith 2005:80). The name Mau 
Mau in the Kikuyu language is meaningless, but Europeans 
were convinced that it was something sinister and that 
Kenyatta was leading the Kikuyu people in the revolt. 
Many of the fears of Kenyatta were due to the time he 
spent in the Russia. In 1932 Kenyatta studied in Moscow at 
a revolutionary institute called the University of Toilers 
of the East. After his study in Moscow Kenyatta went to 
the London School of Economics and published an article on 
Kikuyu life and customs. During World War II he moved to 
Sussex and worked as an agricultural laborer. In 1946 
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Kenyatta returned to Kenya, "anxious to engage in the 
nationalist struggle" (Meredith 2005:81). 
The British eventually suppressed the rebellion, but 
the British government improved economic, educational, and 
political opportunities to try to appease Africans and thus 
prevent them from rebelling in the future (Maxon and 
Ofcansky 2000). In 1960 political parties were allowed to 
reform, and in 1961 Kenyatta was released from prison and 
became the leader of the Kenyan African National Union 
(KANU). Realizing that independence was inevitable, 
Britain granted Kenya independence in December 19 64, and 
Kenyatta was chosen as the president. 
Jomo Kenyatta had massive authority over Kenya during 
his presidency. He dissolved opposition parties in the 
first year of independence, making Kenya a one-party state. 
When opposition leader Oginga Odinga formed an opposition 
party, Kenyatta arrested him and used state power to put 
down opposition (Maxon and Ofcansky 2 000). Kenyatta was 
pro-West and maintained capitalist policies while he was 
president. During his presidency Kenya experienced 
considerable economic growth and social progress. 
The former White Highlands were transferred to African 
owners and Kenyatta oversaw the construction and operation 
of schools and health clinics (Meredith 2005). African 
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business ownership grew from 19 percent in 1964 to 46 
percent in 1973 (Meredith 2005). While this growth may 
seem remarkable, the figures were skewed. Under Kenyatta 
income inequality increased, and "the level of rural 
poverty increased" (Meredith 2005:266). 
Moreover, Kenyatta was increasingly seen as corrupt. 
His wife, Ngina Kenyatta, became one of the wealthiest 
people in the country by owning plantations, ranches, and 
hotels. The ivory trade was highly lucrative, and the 
"high-level corruption cost Kenya half its elephant 
population" (Meredith 2005:267). On August 23, 1978 Jomo 
Kenyatta passed away, and Vice President Daniel arap Moi 
became president of Kenya. 
At first Moi was a populist president, but his rule 
became authoritarian (Maxon and Ofcansky 2000) . According 
to Meredith (2005): 
His rule became a litany of Big Man tactics. He 
curtailed the autonomy of judges and the auditor-
general, eliminating their security of tenure; he 
harassed and imprisoned dissidents, condoning the use 
of torture; he obliterated press freedoms, muzzled 
trade unions and turned the civil service into a party 
machine, (p. 384) 
Moi also eliminated the secret ballot in elections and made 
Kenya a one-party state by law. Elections were manipulated 
to ensure the outcome. 
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Moi and his sons acquired assets in transport, oil 
distribution, banking, engineering, and land. Moi's inner 
circle known as the Karbanet Syndicate obtained loans they 
never intended to pay back and received kickbacks from 
government contracts. Corruption became "embedded in the 
system during the Moi years" (Meredith 2005:385). Moi 
continued to rule this way until 1990 when Robert Ouko, who 
published a dossier on high-level corruption, was found 
dead. 
The world began to notice the corruption of the regime 
and aid agencies suspended their funding to Kenya on 
November 25 1992, resulting in a 30 percent decrease in 
government expenditure (Meredith 2005). Under increasing 
pressure Moi announced multiparty elections on December 2, 
1992. The opposition parties had little time to coordinate 
and split into many different factions, which led to Moi 
winning re-election in 1992 and again in 1997. In 2002 
Mwai Kibaki won the presidential election under a Rainbow 
Coalition of parties, thus ending Moi's 24-year rule. 
Today, Kibaki is currently the president and has declared 
an end to corruption in the government. 
Statistics on Education and Development. Kenya is a 
multiparty democracy, holding free elections for the first 
time in 1992. Yet, corruption is widespread and threatens 
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the development of Kenya. The past history of Kenya is 
i 
important in understanding the effects of education on 
development. 
Similar to Tables 1 and 2, Table 3 provides some basic 
education and development indicators for Kenya between 1990 
and 2 004. 
Table 3: World Bank Data on Kenya - 1990-2004 - Key Variables 
Development Indicators 1990 1995 2000 2004 
GDP per capita, PPP 1,146 1,059 1,019 1,047 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 57.90 53.14 48.43 48.35 
Life expectancy at birth, male (years) 55.78 51.85 48.65 49.19 
Life expectancy at birth, female (years) 60.13 54.50 48.19 47.47 
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 64.0 72.0 77.0 78.5 
Mortality rate, adult female 287.49 . . . . . . . . . 
Mortality rate, adult male 357.37 . . . — . . . 
Health expenditure, total (% of GDP) . . . . . . 4.2 4.3A 
Hospital beds (per 1,000 people) 1.65 . . . . . . . . . 
Physicians (per 1,000 people) 0.05 0.13 . . . 0.14 
External debt, total (DOD, current US$, in Millions) 745 731 614 683 
Total debt service 35.41 30.41 20.94 8.56 
Aid per capita (current US$) 50.61 26.96 16.69 18.98 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows 0.66 0.35 0.87 0.29 
Foreign direct investment, net outflows 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Population ages 0-14 (% of total) 48.89 46.28 44.06 42.92 
Population growth (annual %) 3.32 2.74 2.23 2.22 
Urban population (% of total) 24.69 29.99 35.89 40.49 
Education Variables 
Public spending on education (% of GDP) 6.73# — 6.33 7.05 
Expenditure per student, primary 13.43# . . . . 27.64 25.21 
Expenditure per student, secondary — . . . 18.43 25.14 
Expenditure per student, tertiary . . . . . . . 255.48 409.21 
School enrollment, primary (% net) . . . . . . 66.77 76.43 
School enrollment, secondary (% net) . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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Table 3: World Bank Data on Kenya - 1990-2004 - Key Variables (cont.) 
Education Variables 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Primary completion rate, female 
Primary completion rate, male 
Primary completion rate, total 
Primary education, pupils (% female) 
Persistence to grade 5, total (% of cohort) 76.72# 
49.38 48.28 
75,29A 
88.61 
90.04 
89.33 
Ratio of female to male primary enrollment 
Ratio of female to male secondary enrollment 
Ratio of female to male enrollments in tertiary education 
0.96# 
0.77# 
0.99 0.94 
0.93 
Pupil-teacher ratio, primary 31,52# 39.54 
Literacy rate, adult female 
Literacy rate, adult male 
Literacy rate, adult total 
Literacy rate, youth total 
60.77 
80.91 
70.76 
89.80 
70.23 
77.65 
73.61 
80.32 
A
 - one year less 
# = for one year more 
These development indicators show Kenya as a country 
in decline. The GDP per capita of Kenya has fallen from 
$1,146 (USD) in 1990 to $1,047 (USD) in 2004. Life 
expectancy has also declined over the time period. From 
1990 to 2004 life expectancy has decreased from 57.90 years 
to 48.3 5 years. The infant mortality rate has increased 
from 64 per 1,000 in 1990 to 78.5 per 1,000 in 2004. The 
number of physicians per 1,000 people has increased 
slightly from 0.05 in 1990 to 0.14 in 2004, while overall 
health care expenditures have remained relatively fixed 
over the last several years. 
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Foreign aid has drastically decreased from. $50.61 
million in 1990 tc $18.98 million in 2004. The data show 
an increase in aid from 2000 to 2004, but this is expected 
because aid agencies resumed aid to Kenya in 2003. Over 
this same period of time, foreign direct investment inflows 
decreased from 0.6b to 0.29. External debt in Kenya has 
decreased from $745 million in 1990 to $683 million in 
2004, but external debt increased from 2000 to 2004. Total 
debt service decreased from 35.41 in 1990 to 8.56 in 2004. 
The education indicators reveal impressive changes. 
Education spending is higher in Kenya than in Swaziland or 
Cameroon at 7.05 percent of GDP in 2004. Expenditure per 
student has increased from 13.43 percent of GDP per capita 
in 1991 to 25.21 percent of GDP per capita in 2004. 
Primary school enrollment increased from 66.77 percent in 
2000 to 76.43 percent in 2004. Primary completion rate is 
much higher in Kenya (89.33% in 2004) than in Swaziland 
(61.25% in 2003) and Cameroon (63.26% in 2004). The 
literacy rate of Kenya increased from 70.76 percent in 1990 
to 80.32 percent in 2004. These improvements are the 
direct result of President Kibaki's campaign promise during 
the 2002 election to fund primary school education for all 
Kenyan children. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSES 
In Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland HIV/AIDS is a major 
factor barring development through education. The 
following section will demonstrate how the disease is 
decreasing educational attainment in the three nations. 
HIV/AIDS is an obstacle to the effects of education on 
development. 
HIV/AIDS in Swaziland 
According to the United States' State Department 
(2006), the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the adult population 
of Swaziland is 42.6 percent; this f 1 CfUZTG 1 S the highest 
prevalence rate in the world. According to UNICEF (2007h), 
deaths due to HIV/AIDS will remain high through at least 
2020. The problem has been compounded by the decision of 
King Mswati III to embrace traditional Swazi practices such 
as polygamy and his erratic stance on the HIV/AIDS issue. 
Table 1 shows that health expenditure has decreased as 
HIV/AIDS has increased. 
In 1999 King Mswati III proclaimed the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic a national disaster (Daly 2001). Then in 2001 he 
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forbade men from having intercourse with teenage girls for 
five years to stop AIDS (BBC News 2 007). Many Swazi look 
to South Africa for guidance, where Jacob Zuma, 
presidential candidate, said in 2 006 that "taking a shower" 
would prevent the spread of HIV (The Comeback Kid 2 006:58). 
The unclear message that the king sends his people about 
HIV/AIDS allows myths and rumors, which are not based on 
scientific evidence about the disease to spread. In 1997 a 
local newspaper, Times of Swaziland, ran articles 
dispelling myths that AIDS is caused by "muti" (magic) or 
witchcraft (Daly 2001). According to Daly (2001), many men 
in Swaziland believe that sex with a virgin can cure AIDS; 
this belief has led to attacks on young girls. 
The reason for the mixed signals about HIV/AIDS is 
that Mswati wants to remain the dominant political figure 
in Swaziland. After Sobhuza's death, Mswati has had to 
face a changing political climate. Mswati claims the 
reason why Swaziland has escaped genocide, wars, and other 
problems within Africa is the country's continued reliance 
on tradition. If the king were to admit that change is 
needed in dealing with HIV/AIDS he would be saying 
tradition is not working, thus sacrificing his current 
rationalization for remaining in power. 
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Traditionally women in Swaziland have been in a 
i 
subordinate position to men. Women are not allowed to buy 
land, have a bank account, or move without a male's 
approval (Daly 2001). Swaziland practices polygamy, in 
which the men can marry as many women as they can 
economically afford (Daly 2001). Premarital relations are 
common and accepted as part of tradition in Swaziland. It 
is interesting that Warren, Johnson, Gule, Hlophe, and 
Kraushaar (1992:6) found that "it was easier for a woman 
who had had a child to get married than for a childless 
woman." They go on to state that 85 percent of their 
respondents had children before marriage. In recent years 
the king advocated family planning, but only 17 percent of 
women reported using contraception (Warren et al. 1992). 
Women are often afraid to ask men to use contraception 
because the men will accuse them of being unfaithful. If a 
woman were to use female contraception, the male would 
often think the woman is hiding unfaithfulness from him 
(Daly 2001). Women who test positive are often afraid to 
tell their husbands for fear of bodily harm. On World AIDS 
day, December 1, 1998, Gugu Dlamini announced she was HIV-
positive; twelve days later she was beaten to death (Daly 
2001). 
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The social impact of HIV/AIDS can be measured in 
Swaziland's educational indicators. The Table 1 
educational indicators show that completion rates and 
persistence to Grade 5 are falling. Money is being 
diverted from social programs, such as education, to combat 
the epidemic, which will likely have a long-term negative 
effect on the development of the country. The data in 
Table 1 indicate that primary completion rates for males 
and females declined from 60.83 percent in 1990 to 58.3 0 
percent in 2003 and from 64.81 percent in 1990 to 64.22 
percent in 2003. Yet, the king continues to send mixed 
messages to his people as Table 1 shows that health 
expenditures in Swaziland have decreased. 
Swaziland does not provide free primary education so 
families are forced to choose between health and education. 
The World Bank (2006b) expects the cost of education to 
increase due to the rise of HIV/AIDS among teachers. The 
real impact of HIV/AIDS may not show up in official 
statistics because families without financial resources 
have to pull their children out of school to help take care 
of sick family members. UNICEF (2007a) states that 
As a result of the impact of AIDS, more than one third 
of children cannot access basic services, including 
health, food, education, water, and sanitation, and 
psychosocial support, (p. 2) 
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The confusion among the people of Swaziland on what 
causes HIV/AIDS also will not show up in official 
statistics. If the people do not seek proper medical care 
for the disease, there is no reason to believe that the 
health expenditure would need to increase. Daly (2 001) 
points out that: 
The loss of professionals will be especially notable, 
as their skills, abilities, and knowledge may not be 
easily replaced. For example, Swaziland's Ministry of 
Education currently estimates that the country is 
losing four teachers a week to AIDS. (p. 27) 
The Life Skills Programme in Swaziland was instituted to 
educate people about HIV/AIDS. In a report for UNICEF 
Gachuhi (1999) explained that the program has been 
negligible in educating people about HIV/AIDS. The failure 
of the program helps to explain why the people of Swaziland 
continue to be misinformed about the disease. 
In 2005 the United Nations National Emergency Response 
Council on HIV/AIDS (NERCHA) stated that HIV/AIDS in 
Swaziland has become, "one of the major development 
challenges of the current time" (p. 4). The World Bank 
(2006b) explained that: 
HIV/AIDS impacts the education sector by reducing 
student participation and enrollment, and decreasing 
teacher supplies and learning outcomes. It also 
increases cost and reduces efficiency of the sector, 
(p. 15) 
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As a result of HIV/AIDS, Swaziland cannot provide the best 
learning and educational environment. The disease is 
pulling children out of school to take care of infected 
parents or relatives. The data in Table 1 indicate that 
persistence to Grade 5 is decreasing. Many children must 
disenroll from school because they need to find a job and 
an income because their parents cannot work due to HIV/AIDS 
infection. 
One major consequence of HIV/AIDS is the number of 
children who are orphaned by the loss of their parents to 
the disease. The pandemic has orphaned an estimated 69,000 
children and is expected to orphan another 10,000 a year 
(UNICEF 2005b) in Swaziland alone. UNICEF (2007a) reported 
that: 
over a 10-year period, the proportion of children 
completing primary and secondary education has been 
declining due to the increasing inability of families 
to pay school fees on time. (p. 2) 
Children are forced to drop out of school to take care of 
themselves and younger siblings. The drop in persistence 
to grade five seen in Table 1 may be due to children 
becoming orphaned. 
Until the king accepts that a modern epidemiological 
approach must be taken to deal with the HIV/AIDS issue, the 
disease will continue to divert money and people away from 
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education. The people need to be educated about the 
disease, and women need to be empowered to combat the 
future spread. Development is being hindered in Swaziland 
due to the government's response to the disease and their 
traditional stance on women's rights. Education will 
continue to be hampered by HIV/AIDS until these changes are 
made. 
HIV/AIDS in Cameroon 
A UNAIDS report (2 004) places Cameroon's HIV/AIDS 
infection rate at 6.9 percent, which is the 14th highest in 
Africa. HIV/AIDS is a problem for most African nations, 
but Cameroon in particular has not adapted well to the 
epidemic. UNICEF (2005a:1) stated that "56 percent of the 
population is under 20 years," and "50 percent of people 
live in poverty, with significant regional and sex 
disparities." The report continues: 
Experts attribute the severity of Africa's AIDS 
epidemic to the region's poverty, women's relative 
lack of empowerment, high rates of male worker 
migration, and other factors. Health systems are ill-
equipped for prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. 
(Cook 2006:1) 
Cameroon's high rates of poverty and "discrimination 
against girls' schooling is common practice in many 
schools, within families, and communities" (UNICEF 2003:1). 
As seen in Table 2, health expenditure has decreased from 
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4.4 percent of GDP per capita in 2000 to 4.2 percent in 
2003 . 
The rate of HIV/AIDS in Cameroon has been much higher 
as UNICEF (2005a) demonstrates that, "HIV/AIDS increased 
from 0.5 percent in 1987 to 11 percent in 2000." The past 
rates of HIV/AIDS and the current rate of 6.9 percent 
explains the decrease in life expectancy from 52.4 years in 
1990 to 45.98 years in 2004. The epidemic also may be the 
cause of the decrease in population growth displayed in 
Table 2 from 2.87 percent in 1990 to 1.82 percent in 2004. 
One of the major concerns with such high rates of 
HIV/AIDS is the effect the disease has on families and 
children. UNICEF (2005a) stated that "it has been 
devastating for families already weakened by poverty. 
There are an estimated 45,3 00 HIV-positive children." The 
number of children orphaned by the disease has a negative 
effect on schooling in the country. The education 
indicators from Table 2 for Cameroon have declined 
considerably or are missing, but this could point to the 
lack of investment in HIV/AIDS prevention in Cameroon. The 
primary school expenditure per student is lower than 
Swaziland's and Kenya's, and primary school enrollments are 
lower than in Swaziland. 
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Lack of resources at the government and the local 
i 
level has prevented many people in Cameroon from averting 
the spread of the disease. "A three-day supply of 
breastmilk substitutes (i.e., infant formula) cost $4, more 
than those earning minimum wage can afford" (UNICEF 2007b). 
This lack of resources is not due to the world turning its 
back on Cameroon. As Table 2 displays, aid per capita has 
increased from $38.25 million in 1990 to $47.48 million in 
2004 . 
According to the BBC News (2007c), "the country's 
progress is hampered by a level of corruption that is among 
the highest in the world." According to Gros (2003:25) in 
2000 Transparency International "ranked Cameroon the most 
corrupt country in the world." In addition, "the Global 
Fund and the World bank have allocated more than $133 
million to stem the tide of HIV/Aids" (BBC News 2006a). 
The government of Cameroon has claimed to put more than 
$4.5 million to combat AIDS (BBC News 2006a). Yet, this 
money is not reaching the people who need the money to buy 
medicine and receive treatment for the disease. 
The money is supposed to go to antiretroviral (ARV) 
medication for mothers to stop the spread of the disease to 
their unborn children, infant feeding counseling, and 
support. UNICEF (2007b) explains that the money is not 
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being delivered for these preventative measures. It is not 
clear where the money is going because: 
the complete absence of written records makes proving 
corruption extremely difficult, and until recently the 
subject has been taboo in government circles. (BBC 
News 2006a) 
Damaris Mounlom ran a Non-Governmental Organization 
(NGO) for women's health and development in Cameroon. She 
reported "financial irregularities" in money that was 
allocated to be used for the fight against AIDS (BBC News 
2 0 06a). Mounlom quickly found herself, "blacklisted by the 
health ministry, and has now been removed from the National 
Aids Strategy Committee" (BBC News 2006a). The corruption 
in Cameroon's government results in donors questioning 
whether their money should go elsewhere. 
The effects that education has on development will 
continue to be obstructed by the HIV/AIDS crisis if the 
government does not take a firmer stance on the disease. 
Monies that are allocated to fight the disease need to 
reach the people who need the money to help fight the 
epidemic. Instead, because of the corruption in Cameroon 
the money is being used for unknown purposes and is not 
helping the people of Cameroon. The disease negates any 
benefits education could bring to Cameroon. 
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HIV/AIDS in Kenya 
Bell, Bruhns, and Gersbach (2006) state that: 
the AIDS epidemic threatens Kenya with a long wave of 
premature adult mortality, and thus with an enduring 
setback to the formation of human capital and economic 
growth, (p. 1) 
The current HIV/AIDS rate in Kenya is 6.1 per 1,000 
(UNAIDS 2006a) , and Table 3 illustrates life expectancy has 
been decreasing in Kenya. Yet, Kenya's response to 
HIV/AIDS has been impressive when compared to other African 
nations. According to UNAIDS (2006a) only Kenya and 
Zimbabwe in sub-Saharan Africa have decreasing rates of 
HIV/AIDS. 
The government has played a critical role in aiding 
the people of Kenya in dealing with the disease. The 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGASS) (2006) reports: 
Following widespread initial reluctance to tackle the 
epidemic in the early 1980s, there is now strong 
political will to reverse the spread of HIV and AIDS 
in Kenya, and to take constructive steps toward 
mitigating the effects of the epidemic. The fight has 
public support and leadership from President Mwai 
Kibaki and from many senior political leaders, (p. 4) 
The government has helped to increase knowledge of the 
disease and Kenyans rates of HIV/AIDS have fallen from "10 
percent in the late 1990s" (UNICEF 2007c). 
Kenya's success is based on the "Three Ones" 
principle, which is one national strategic action plan, one 
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national coordinating authority, and one national 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system (United Nations 
General ... 2 006) . Kenya is seen as an example for other 
countries to follow when dealing with the AIDS epidemic. 
In fact, UNAIDS (2 005:1) states, "leaders from DFID, 
Norway, UNAIDS, and the World Bank today praised Kenya's 
response to AIDS." One of the real strengths of Kenya's 
fight against HIV/AIDS is that it is being discussed 
openly. According to the BBC News (2006b), "the issue is 
openly discussed in political circles and the media and 
condoms are promoted" (P. 2) . 
As the data in Table 3 demonstrate life expectancy has 
decreased, but the HIV/AIDS rate in Kenya is high when 
compared to high-income countries. There is hope that the 
AIDS epidemic will continue to fall. Kenya has been 
conducting anonymous testing for HIV since 1990. The 
anonymous testing removes the stigma that surrounds the 
disease, making people more likely to get tested especially 
women. 
The prevalence of HIV among women is 8.3 percent, 
while for men is 4.3 percent. The lower life expectancy 
for women, as shown in Table 3, demonstrates that women are 
more susceptible to the disease. UNAIDS (2006b:6) states: 
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the number of women and girls infected with HIV is 
increasing in every region of the world and in sub-
Saharan Africa, they make up almost 60% of people 
living with the virus, (p. 6) 
Kenya has been able to educate and explain how the disease 
is spread; thus, they have been able to lower their 
HIV/AIDS rate. Kenya is only the second country in sub-
Saharan Africa to have a significant decline in HIV 
infection levels (United Nations General ... 2006) . 
Another problem the disease presents is children 
orphaned by the disease. Kenya began offering free primary 
education in 2003, and an unintended consequence of 
offering free schooling was a drop in HIV/AIDS among 
children. Duflo, Dupas, Kremer, and Sinei (2006) explained 
that, "reducing the cost of education by paying for school 
uniforms reduced dropout rates, teen marriages, and 
childbearing" (p. 1). By reducing school fees children are 
able to focus on education, and Kenya has seen a reduction 
in sexual activity among the young. As the data in Table 3 
indicate this to be true by showing that primary school 
enrollments have increased from 2000 to 2004. 
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has slowed Kenya's progress as 
many adults have died due to the disease. The disease has 
created an imbalance in which "half of the 31.5 million 
people in Kenya are children under 18 years of age" (UNGASS 
2 006:11). With so many children and the reduction of 
school fees the educational system in Kenya has been 
overwhelmed. According to UNGASS (2006) "primary school 
classes typically have more orphans than teachers can cope 
with, further compromising the quality of education" (p. 
10). UNICEF (2007d) explains that, "1.3 million new pupils 
poured into the country's schools" (p. 1). 
The demand for teachers is also high in Kenya. The 
decrease in life expectancy and the high rates of HIV/AIDS 
in the past and today have claimed the lives of many 
teachers. Kenya is struggling to replace the teachers and 
Kenya's pupil to teacher ratio has increased from 31.52 in 
1991 to 39.54 in 2004, according to Table 3. 
Kenya's HIV/AIDS rate is high when compared to other 
regions of the world, but Kenya seems to be on the right 
track to stop the spread of the deadly disease. The key to 
Kenya's success is the response by the government. The 
government has acknowledged the disease, which Swaziland 
and Cameroon are reluctant to do. President Kibaki has 
established a program to combat the disease, and it seems 
to be working. The effects of the disease will continue to 
be felt in Kenya for many years to come. Orphans will 
continue to plague the country, and the loss of teachers 
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will hamper education, but the positives of the 
government's response outweigh the negatives. 
Land Distribution 
In each of the three countries another barrier 
stunting development through education is unequal land 
distribution. Each country has a different type of land 
distribution problem, but all three exhibit unequal land 
distribution. The unequal land distribution causes many 
people in each country to experience malnutrition due to 
droughts and food shortages. With the scarcity of food and 
water children cannot attend school and increase the 
country's human capital; therefore, the effects of 
education on development are negated by the unequal land 
distribution in each country. 
Title Deed Land in Swaziland 
Title Deed Land (TDL) comprises 40 percent of the 
nation. The land held by the TDL consists of the best 
agricultural land in the country. The middleveld has the 
most suitable land for agriculture and is held by TDL 
(Booth 2000). In 1904 Sir Alfred Milner appointed a 
commission to fairly distribute Swazi land among the local 
Swazis, Europeans, and the king of Swaziland. The 
Concessions Partitions Proclamation of 1907 divided 
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Swaziland into three land categories: Swazi areas, European 
farms, and Crown Lands (Grotpeter 1975) . 
The British and the king acquired the best land that 
Swaziland had to offer, while Swazis were given the poorest 
land in terms of its potential agricultural output. After 
the British granted independence to Swaziland, the land 
that was held by Great Britain was given to King Sobhuza 
II. The king kept a large amount of the land he received 
for himself and created an investment fund called the 
Tibiyo takaNgwane. Today Mswati owns many important mines 
and agricultural lands. The land that Swazis were given is 
much of the lowveld, which is prone to drought. To make 
the lowveld productive the king irrigated the land, and 
today it is the most irrigated area in Swaziland. It is 
unfortunate that Swaziland endured two successive years of 
drought in 1999 and 2000, and. in 2004 a national disaster 
emergency was declared by the government (UNICEF 2 007a:2). 
Southern Africa experienced a drought in 2006, and today 
Swaziland cannot provide enough food for its people. 
UNICEF estimates that approximately 3 0 percent of the 
people are stunted (chronic malnutrition) in 2007. 
Drought is not the only problem that this unequal land 
distribution has caused. The World Bank (2006b:13) states 
that "Swaziland is considered a middle-income country, but 
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income distribution is highly unequal." Land that is 
highly productive is owned by foreign capital or the king, 
which division leads to a high rate of income inequality in 
Swaziland. "Nearly 7 0 percent of the population lives 
below the national poverty line. Unemployment continues to 
be high hovering above 30 percent" (World Bank 2006b:13). 
According to the World Bank (2006b:14), "Swaziland 
faces a fiscal crisis." The unequal land distribution and 
droughts have slowed Swaziland's economic growth. 
After recording sizable surpluses during much of the 
1990s, the central government budget has recorded 
persistently widening deficits since 1999/2000. (World 
Bank 2006b:14) 
The data in Table 1 indicate that Swaziland's external debt 
grew from $288 million in 2000 to $470 million in 2004. 
Swaziland has managed to increase educational spending 
from 1990-2004, but droughts, AIDS (which kill farmers), 
and the increasing urban population have brought food 
shortages. The food shortages have increased the number of 
malnourished children in Swaziland. Primary school 
enrollments have increased, but persistence to Grade 5 has 
decreased as is shown in Table 1. As families run short on 
food, the money that is paying for the child's education is 
being diverted to buy food. 
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Swaziland needs a more equal distribution of land if 
the country is to develop in the future. Because the crown 
and foreign companies own much of the land that is 
productive, when a disaster strikes, such as a drought, the 
subsistence farmer is hurt the most. The Swazis are forced 
to choose between buying food or sending their children to 
primary school. 
The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon 
There are over 250 ethnic identities in Cameroon, but 
the conflict between the Anglophones and the Francophones 
has hampered efforts to build consensus and coalitions 
throughout Cameroon. Krieger (1994:605) explains that 
"Cameroon's upheavals since 1990 have not been widely 
reported among the more visible and violent African state-
society conflicts." Since 1989 the Biya government has 
been under, "periods of political instability, at times 
almost chaos, and the threat of a civil war" (DeLancey and 
DeLancey 2000:9). 
The roots of the tension between the two groups lay in 
the colonization of the country. France invested heavily 
in the Francophone region of Cameroon, while Britain left 
the Anglophone region to be governed by Nigeria; thus, the 
Anglophone region of Cameroon was significantly poorer when 
unified with the Francophone region (Ndongko 1980). 
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There can be no doubt that the administration of 
Southern Cameroons as an appendage of Nigeria resulted, 
in the blatant neglect of its development. (Konings 
and Nyamnjoh 1997:208) 
Ahidjo consolidated the two regions quickly because he 
feared that the multiple ethnic populations in Cameroon 
would split the loyalty of the people into ethnic groups 
and not into a unified Cameroon (DeLancey and DeLancey 
2000). But, the economic differences upon unification have 
led to tension and mistrust over the years. Anglophones 
feel "marginalized, exploited, and assimilated by the 
francophone-dominated state, and even by the francophone 
population as a whole" (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997:2 07). 
The tension has reached such levels that "some anglophones 
have given up the idea of Cameroon and have begun to demand 
independence as the Republic of Ambazonia" (DeLancey and 
DeLancey 2000:9). 
The conflict between the two groups has obstructed the 
effects of education on development. Anglophones do not 
trust the Francophone government, and Anglophones point out 
that "Cameroon as a whole is hardly flourishing, but 
Anglophone Cameroon is totally malnourished" (BBC News 
2004). The Anglophone region has little development, and 
the roads in the region are "shocking" (BBC News 2 004) . 
When elections are held many Cameroonians feel that the 
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elections will not be fair or free and do not take part. 
France continues to be Cameroon's main trading partner 
today, further increasing tension in the Anglophone region 
(U.S. Department of State 1999). 
The official languages of Cameroon are French and 
English, and all schools are taught in French or English 
(Robinson 1990). This language split further divides the 
two groups, and other ethnicities in the country have to 
gain a knowledge of one of the two languages or be left out 
of the educational system altogether. Many Cameroonians 
have acquired a mixture of French and English called 
"Frananglias" that is further complicating schooling in 
Cameroon (BBC News 2 007d). Teachers have to know how to 
speak many languages to communicate with their students, 
and it is becoming increasingly difficult for Cameroon to 
find qualified people to fill this role. 
The effects of the Anglophone problem will not be 
directly visible in Table 2. Yet, the tension and constant 
threat of civil war hampers development in Cameroon. The 
discovery of oil on Anglophone land has been negated by the 
tension the two groups have toward each other. The unique 
and complicated culture of Cameroon has hindered 
development and made a uniform educational system 
impossible to achieve. Without a standardized educational 
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system in Cameroon any effects that education has on 
development may be negated. 
The two national languages in Cameroon further divide 
the country. Anglophones have no need to learn French 
because all of their schools are taught in English. It is 
also true that the Francophones have no need to learn 
English for the same reason. Cameroon instituted a local-
language literacy program, but there had not been any 
evidence of development due to the program (Robinson 1990). 
By having two different languages Cameroon cannot unify 
around a common culture, which would aid the two groups 
understanding of each other. 
Drought in Kenya 
Drought in Kenya poses a severe problem to 
development. As little as 11 percent of Kenya's land is 
used for agriculture so, when a drought happens, many 
people are effected. According to UNICEF (2005c) "over 
half of Kenyans, including 9 million children live below 
the poverty line" (p. 1). With so many people living below 
the poverty line a access to water and food is crucial to 
survival. 
Free primary education has increased school 
enrollments, but drought reverses that effect. UNICEF 
(2007c) states that "school dropout rates are increasing, 
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especially in drought-affected areas" (p. 1). UNICEF 
(2007e) goes on to say, "besides the immediate threat of 
malnutrition and dehydration, their future is at risk 
because so many boys and girls are being forced to drop out 
of school" (p. 1). 
Children are being forced from school to look for 
whatever food or water is available. Many schools are 
being shut down in drought-stricken areas because their 
wells have run dry (UNICEF 2007e). Northern areas of Kenya 
are particularly susceptible to drought. In these areas 
education is becoming the exception rather than the rule 
(UNICEF 2007f) . 
The decrease in life expectancy shown in Table 3 can 
be explained by the drought as thousands are malnourished. 
The corruption found in Kenya's government has compounded 
the probl em. The IMF and World Bank stopped aid to Kenya 
in 1992 due to the corruption found in the government. 
Meredith (2 005) estimates that aid made up to 3 0 percent of 
the government expenditure. The step drop off of aid 
reduced the government's ability to deal with a drought. 
The BBC News (2007e:l) explains that "a long-running 
regional drought has put millions of Kenyans in need of 
food aid." 
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The data in Table 3 show that foreign aid has 
decreased from $50.61 million in 1990 to $18.98 million in 
2004. The lost $31.63 million could have helped to buy 
food and water to the drought areas. The corruption in the 
government will be discussed in the succeeding section, but 
the government has caused the drought to become a worse 
disaster, by not providing aid to the people. Drought will 
continue to cause major development problems in Kenya. 
Education is being hampered by the lack of food and water 
in the areas experiencing droughts. The effects of 
education on development are being barred by the drought. 
Corruption in the Government 
The last barrier found is corruption. Cameroon and 
Swaziland have secret funds,- and no one is aware of how the 
funds are being used. Kenya's government has been accused 
of outright robbery of money from the treasury. The loss 
of funds has robbed the people of money that could have 
been used to fund HIV/AIDS treatment, drought relief, 
school fees, and other programs. As long as corruption 
remains at its current levels, each country will continue 
to lose any gains in development that could be made through 
education. 
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Tibiyo takaNgwane Fund in Swaziland 
The Tibiyo takaNgwane is an investment fund the king 
established to help Swaziland develop. Sobhuza II created 
the Tibiyo when Swaziland gained independence from Britain 
because he believed that the fund could be used to fund 
social services and development projects. Since the .1970s 
the Tibiyo has been able to acquire shares of every major 
foreign-owned enterprise such as hotels, mines, 
construction, forestry, and agriculture in Swaziland (Booth 
2000). 
The money from the Tibiyo is placed in a separate 
treasury, and the amount of the fund is kept secret. The 
Tibiyo is not considered in calculations of GDP and other 
economic indicators and is not taxed. While the data in 
Table 1 show Swaziland's GDP increasing from $3,919 in 1990 
to $5,182 in 2004 no one knows what growth could have taken 
place if the Tibiyo was included in the GDP. The fund is 
used for the benefit of the monarchy and not for the 
benefit of the Swazi nation, contrary to what the king 
would say (Booth 2000). Because the Tibiyo is kept secret 
and not taxed, there is no way of knowing how much the fund 
is dampening Swaziland's economic growth. 
Mswati III states that the Tibiyo is used to increase 
investment in the nation, but critics have pointed out that 
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the Tibiyo is kept secret so that Swazis do not know what 
the Tibiyo is being used for. The Tibiyo funds a newspaper 
in Swaziland, but Swaziland does not have freedom of 
speech. The government also uses the funds for a radio 
station, which plays only religious programs (U.S. 
Department of State 2006). The fund's main purpose is to 
maintain political power in Swaziland. According to the 
U.S. State Department, Swaziland has a bad human rights 
record including arbitrary killings by security forces, 
police torture, beatings and excessive force, infringement 
on citizens' privacy rights, and poor enforcement of 
women's rights. 
The fund stifles growth in Swaziland by diverting 
money that could be used for development and social 
services. The World Bank (2006a:19) states that 
"Swaziland's fiscal crisis has not been for the lack of 
resources." No one is sure how much money is in the 
Tibiyo, but whatever amount is in the fund could be used to 
help the current fiscal crisis. If the money generated 
from foreign business were included in the government's 
budget, the fiscal crisis might be alleviated. Add the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic and the drought, and the money taken away 
from the nation by the Tibiyo creates the current situation 
in Swaziland. Swaziland is not able to deal with 
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unexpected financial burdens while the Tibiyo continues to 
exist. The Tibiyo denies education, which has been shown 
as a development indicator; the money and resources could 
be used to aid in Swaziland's development. The fund also 
denies money that could be use to alleviate the food and 
water crisis brought on by the drought and could aid the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic by paying for medicine and education 
programs. 
Compte Hors Budget (CHB) in Cameroon 
Oil was discovered in the 1970s and was initially a 
great boom to the Cameroon economy (DeLancey and DeLancey 
2 000). The revenue from the oil was used to fund 
development projects, but oil revenue was also used to fund 
poorly planned projects (DeLancey and DeLancey 2 000). 
Also, the discovery of oil led to increased tensions 
between Cameroon and Nigeria. The two countries claim that 
the Bakassi peninsula, which juts into the Gulf of Guinea, 
is part of their country. The Bakassi peninsula "may 
contain up to 10% of the world's oil and gas reserves" (BBC 
News 2 006c). 
The discovery of oil has led to the creation of the 
compte hors budget (CHB). The CHB is a secret account in 
which the revenue from oil production is deposited. Funds 
deposited in the CHB were used to supplement the official 
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budget of Cameroon, with the president having complete 
discretion over how the funds were used (DeLancey and 
DeLancey 2000). The fund is no longer in existence, but 
Biya is believed to have a secret account today (Van de 
Walle 1989) . 
Oil revenues are not evenly distributed throughout the 
country. Konings and Nyamnjoh (1997) state, "oil revenues 
were alleged to be used by those in power to feed 'the 
bellies' of their allies, and to stimulate the economy in 
other regions" (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997:214). Most of 
the oil in the region is found on Anglophone or land other 
than Francophone. The discovery of oil has led to an 
increase in hostility as discussed in the previous section. 
Oil is located in the South and Southwest, which are 
"populated by groups that feel estranged from the state and 
are not willing to let it exploit 'their' resources without 
their input" (Gros 2003:21). It is difficult to state the 
size of the oil income because the revenue is a secret and 
the earnings are not part of the annual budget (DeLancey 
and DeLancey 2 000) . 
The Bakassi peninsula was awarded to Cameroon in an 
International Court of Justice ruling in 2002. But the 
tension between the Anglophones and Francophones has made 
the transition violent and chaotic. According to the BBC 
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News (2 006c) many residents, "would rather leave their 
i 
ancestral land than be ruled by Cameroon, such is their 
level of distrust." Many residents have vowed to fight any 
attempt Cameroon makes to administer the area and have 
called for help from militants in the Niger Delta. Nigeria 
and Cameroon had bloody clashes over the area in 1994 that 
claimed 34 lives, and Nigeria began withdrawing troops from 
the peninsula on August 1, 2 006 (BBC News 2 006c). 
The oil revenue should be a benefit to a developing 
country such as Cameroon, but this benefit has not been the 
case. The CHB siphons unknown amounts of money away from 
projects that could promote increases in social services, 
including education, and could help Cameroon to develop. 
Cameroon does not have a free educational system and "the 
cost of learning materials and other school-related 
expenses are difficult for low-income families to bear" 
(UNICEF 2003). "Classes are overcrowded, teachers are in 
short supply and inadequately trained, and school hygiene 
and sanitation facilities are inadequate" (UNICEF 2003). 
The CHB may no longer be an official budget, but 
Anglophones and researchers still believe that Biya is 
keeping a secret account with oil revenues (Van de Walle 
1989). It is not hard to imagine that Biya would have a 
101 
secret account considering the level of corruption in the 
country mentioned in the previous section. 
The data in Table 2 show a decline in GDP per capita 
from $2,042 (USD) in 1990 to $1,997 (USD) in 2004, but we 
do not know what the GDP could be if the oil revenue were 
included in the GDP. Health expenditure has decreased from 
2000 to 2003. Some of the oil revenue could have been used 
to increase health expenditure, which would aid HIV/AIDS 
prevention discussed earlier. Exposing how much income is 
generated from oil production and where the money is being 
spent may also help to decrease tension among the 
Anglophones and Francophones. If the money were used to 
fight HIV/AIDS or build infrastructure in the Anglophones 
area, mistrust would be dampened. By using some of the oil 
revenue for social services in the Bakassi Peninsula the 
people may not look at Cameroon with such anger. 
The external debt has been increasing in Cameroon from 
1990 to 2004. The income generated by oil production could 
have reduced the debt or even have made borrowing 
unnecessary during this time period. Again, it is not 
clear how much money the oil sector creates, but "U.S. 
investment in Cameroon is about $1 million, most of it in 
the oil sector" (U.S. Department of State 1999). The 
number may seem low, but France is the largest trade 
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partner with Cameroon, and France would provide much more 
revenue to Cameroon than would the United States. The 
increase in external debt decreases the amount of money 
that can be spent on education. 
The secret oil revenue provides a particularly tricky 
problem in assessing the effects of education on the 
development of Cameroon. There is no clear evidence as to 
how much revenue is generated by the oil industry, but the 
revenue is probably substantial. HIV/AIDS is a major 
problem that is in need of funds for medicine. Anglophones 
could be shown that the money from the oil was being used 
to help them, and the money could also be used to stop the 
growing external debt. The secret oil fund will continue 
to skew the data in Cameroon, and the effects of education 
will continue to be obstructed. 
Corruption in the Government of Kenya 
Corruption in the Kenyan government has been present 
since independence. Jomo Kenyatta's wife and daughter were 
involved in the ivory trade and "high-level corruption cost 
Kenya half its elephant population" during his rule 
(Meredith 2005:2 67). Daniel arap Moi's rule may have been 
the most corrupt rule of any of the Kenyan leaders. Moi 
used any tactic he could to suppress opposition to his 
party, including arrest, detention, and torture (Meredith 
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2005). Journalists, academics, trade unionists, and 
members of parliament were the focus of Moi's vengeance for 
speaking out against him. 
Five men have recently been charged with fraud in the 
Goldenberg affair, which Kenya's Attorney General Amos Wako 
says cost Kenya over $600 million (BBC News 2006d). Gold 
and diamonds, which Kenya has no gold or diamonds, from 
other countries were re-exported and officials claimed the 
money for themselves. The scam was part of Moi's 
compensation scheme, which paid money to Goldenberg 
International to promote exports and encourage foreign 
exchange earnings. The scheme was so successful that gold 
rivaled tea as Kenya's biggest export. 
Moi did not stop at money schemes as he rigged 
elections to ensure that he stayed in power. After 
announcing multiparty elections in 1992 Moi won 
questionable elections in 1992 and 1997 (Meredith 2005) . 
In 2 002 Moi was defeated and forced from office. The BBC 
News (2006e) explains that, "the people were no longer 
prepared to accept misrule and graft" (p. 1). 
President Mwai Kibaki won the election largely on his 
claim to end corruption. He promised, "corruption will now 
cease to be a way of life in Kenya" (BBC News 2006f). Yet, 
Kibaki has not had the ability to stop corruption. Under 
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Kibaki allegations have been made that "corruption has cost 
Kenya $lb - nearly a fifth of its state budget" (BBC News 
2005). According to the BBC News (2007a): 
high-level corruption and nepotism scandals have 
continued, the tribalism that has dogged Kenya's post-
independence history has been rearing its head again 
and the coalition that brought Mr. Kibaki to power has 
dissolved into factions, (p. 1) 
Kibaki has also been plagued with the Anglo Leasing 
affair. The Anglo Leasing affair cost Kenya millions of 
dollars by giving bogus security contracts to Kenyan 
businessmen with suspicious pasts (BBC News 2006f). Four 
ministers resigned over the allegations, and President 
Kibaki reappointed three of them. In response to the 
scandal the World Bank put a $2 6 0 million aid package on 
hold. 
The scandals and corruption have left President Kibaki 
appearing weak. In response to the pressure Kibaki ordered 
police raids on media houses in Kenya (BBC News 2006g). 
The BBC News (2006g:l) states, "there is a genuine shock 
and amazement in Kenya that hooded armed police were used 
to raid media houses." The police raided the Standard 
newspaper offices and the television station KTN, which 
were critical of Kibaki's recent scandals. 
The corruption in Kenya has cost Kenya opportunities 
to deal with other problems, such as HIV/AIDS and the 
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drought. Government officials and businessmen are stealing 
money that could be used to promote HIV/AIDS education, buy 
medication for AIDS, or provide food aid for the people 
living in drought-stricken areas. The data in Table 3 show 
the loss in foreign aid that Kenya has experienced. The 
aid could be used in the same way as the loss of money from 
these corruption scandals. 
While the data in Table 3 show that public spending on 
education has increased the HIV/AIDS and drought have 
pushed some children out of school. As the data in Table 3 
illustrate that persistence to grade 5 has fallen from 1991 
to 2003. Deaths due to HIV/AIDS have raised the pupil to 
teacher ratio from 31.52 in 1991 to 39.54 in 2004. 
Kenya is a leader in sub-Saharan Africa in the fight 
against AIDS, but without the corruption schemes more 
foreign aid would flow into Kenya helping to fight the 
disease even further. The same holds true for the drought 
in Kenya's northern regions. More aid would help to 
alleviate some of the water and food shortages in these 
regions. The corruption in Kenya will continue to obstruct 
the effects of education on development. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 
The focus of this study has been the barriers to the 
effects of education on development. Hage et al. (1988) 
explained that, by expanding the educational system, 
countries increase their economic growth. This finding may 
be true, but the current study shows that there are 
barriers that hinder what education can bring to a country. 
Increasing human capital through the educational system, as 
Oketch (2005) illustrated can work, but it is important to 
understand that many countries cannot simply pour vast 
amounts of money into the educational system and expect 
results. The three factors brought to light by this study 
show that there are inhibiting factors that need to be 
addressed to experience all the benefits that a formal 
education can bring. 
Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland all increased public 
spending on education from 1990-2004, but only Swaziland's 
GDP increased over this time period. If educational 
expansion raised human capital, then all three should have 
experienced growth, but growth did not happen. The 
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barriers mitigate any effect that education might have in 
the country. Sachs (2005:244) explained human capital as 
any form of "health, nutrition, and skills needed for a 
person to be economically productive." The barriers to 
development found in this study operate against the health, 
nutrition, and skills of the people in the country. 
Stopping HIV/AIDS, unequal land distribution, and 
corruption are all keys in acquiring the health, nutrition, 
and skills that Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland need to 
develop further. 
Furthermore, the barriers discussed in this study 
provide an illustration of the community-capitals model. 
HIV/AIDS lowers the human capital, poor land distribution 
decreases the natural capital, and corruption decreases the 
political capital of each country in the study. Together 
all three barriers work together to negate any potential 
development a country could achieve. 
Hoffman and Centeno (2003) explored how stratification 
stems from the global economic system, internal 
colonialism, and the underdevelopment of state structures 
in Latin America. The same holds true for the Cameroon, 
Kenya, and Swaziland. The barring factors stem from the 
countries' colonial legacy, but today the underdeveloped 
health-care system in each country allowed HIV/AIDS to 
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reach the epidemic levels it has. The three countries' 
land distribution has led to internal colonialism. 
Cameroon's Anglophone population, Kenya's ethnic tribes, 
and Swaziland's poor all experience internal colonialism 
through the unequal land distribution in those countries. 
All three countries depend on agriculture, thus locating 
them in the periphery in the global economic system. 
Summary of Findings 
This research has identified several factors in a 
sample of three African countries (Swaziland, Cameroon, and 
Kenya) that represent modern-day roadblocks preventing 
human capital formation from having a positive impact on 
economic development and social progress. While each 
country possesses a unique colonial and post-colonial 
history, patterns emerge showing similar barriers that have 
served to limit development. 
HIV/AIDS is a major problem facing Swaziland, 
Cameroon, and Kenya. While Kenya appears to be making 
significant strides to curb the spread of the disease, 
Swaziland and Cameroon have not shown signs of improvement 
as measured in HIV/AIDS infection rates over the last 
several decades. The disease has left an unknown number of 
children orphaned and reduced the human capital in each 
country. HIV/AIDS is one of the most important factors 
1(39 
preventing education from having a positive effect on human 
development. 
Land-distribution and land tenure issues are another 
problem that each country in this study has experienced. 
Swaziland's unequal share of land stems from its colonial 
legacy. The distribution of land in Swaziland gives the 
monarchy the right to utilize the highest quality farmland, 
while the poor must utilize less-productive areas. The 
poor also must cope with droughts and other disasters, thus 
leaving millions of people dependent on government aid to 
survive. Cameroon's land distribution also stems from 
colonization. The majority Francophone population enjoys a 
higher standard of living than the minority Anglophone 
population. The Francophone people of Cameroon control the 
best farmland, while the Anglophones must cope with the 
more arid regions of the country. Roads, schools, 
hospitals, and other social services are neglected in the 
Anglophone area leading to resentment and anger that may 
manifest itself in acts of civil war. The arid North of 
Kenya poses a problem for development with millions of 
people facing malnutrition. In the North Kenya's 
educational system is being closed or abandoned by the 
people because they must focus on finding water and food 
necessary for their survival. 
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Corruption is the last key factor barrier of 
development through education in Cameroon, Kenya, and 
Swaziland. Swaziland taxes business and places the money 
in the Tibiyo. The people of Swaziland probably do not 
benefit from the hidden funds because no one is sure what 
the funds are used for. The CHB in Cameroon may not 
officially exist today, but many experts believe that money 
is being hidden from the people. The secrecy over oil 
revenues steals money that could be used for education or 
other social services. The Anglophones remain skeptical of 
the Francophone government because the money from oil, 
which is on Anglophone land, does not seem to be improving 
their area. Kenya's corruption has cost Kenya numerous aid 
packages that could have gone to improving the 
infrastructure of the country. Kenyans in the arid North 
might have benefited greatly from the aid that was cut off 
from Kenya. 
These three issues cannot be resolved independently as 
they are all significantly related to each other. Kenya may 
be making progress in the fight against HIV/AIDS, but 
millions are on the verge of death and starvation in the 
North. If the government were to clean up the corruption, 
then additional aid could help the drought victims as well 
as residents infected by HIV/AIDS. Until the government 
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addresses corruption, HIV/AIDS, and drought victims will 
remain in a precarious position in Kenyan society, as aid 
will continue to be sporadic. 
The highest rates of HIV/AIDS are in Swaziland. In 
order to address this problem, Swaziland has to examine che 
land distribution and Tibiyo. The poor people live on 
inadequate land and cannot provide for themselves. Without 
the ability to provide for themselves and their families, 
many males work in South Africa. The transient nature of 
the males' work led many men to brothels and increased 
HIV/AIDS infections and transmission rates within 
Swaziland. At the same time the Tibiyo denies money that 
could go to aiding people infected with the disease. The 
three factors work together to decrease children's 
involvement in school, thus neutralizing the positive 
effect education could have on development. 
Cameroon's Anglophone problem cannot be solved until 
the government uses some of the oil revenues to build 
infrastructure in Anglophone regions. Anglophones are 
resentful of the Francophones and have threatened civil 
war, joining Nigeria, or forming an independent state. At 
the same time HIV/AIDS has remained high in Cameroon. The 
epidemic has taken a bac k seat while Cameroorxians fight 
over oil revenues among themselves and with Nigeria. The 
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anger and resentment over the oil revenues has allowed 
HIV/AIDS to remain in the background and wreak havoc on 
Cameroon's human capital. 
Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland all show the same 
barriers on development. All three factors work 
interdependently and only when addressed together will each 
country have the potential to build human capital and 
increase their levels of economic development. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study is exploratory and descriptive in nature. 
Further research is needed examining the causal linkages in 
the variables identified in this study. Moreover, more 
cases need to be examined in Africa and in countries in 
Central and South America and in Asia. By examining more 
cases the findings will become more generalizable to other 
countries in Africa and other regions of the world. 
The large amount of missing and/or incomplete data 
from the World Bank and other institutions for African 
countries represents a significant limitation to this study 
and any study examining development in Africa. Many years 
of missing data from the World Bank make any economic 
growth difficult to assess. The levels of corruption in 
many African nations leave researchers unaware of what 
funds are available and how they are being spent or used. 
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Secret funds prevent researchers from tracking what the 
money is being used for and how much money is being kept 
secret. 
Another limitation to the study is the reliance on 
news networks, government organizations, and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for some of the 
historical-comparative data used in this study. These 
groups may have ulterior motives because their funding may 
depend on results and other findings. Yet, even with data 
inadequate and corruption rampant these organizations are 
the best source available for information on the countries. 
The study also is limited in the small amount of 
resources used. The information used to assess each 
country came from news organizations and aid organizations. 
These organizations can have an agenda that is pushed and 
not truthful to the actual situation in the country. The 
present study did the best at finding trends in each 
country, but the narrow focus may limit the findings 
generalizablity. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The current study focused on Cameroon, Kenya, and 
Swaziland. A good starting point for future research would 
be to examine different countries in Africa. If other 
countries in Africa experience the same barriers or 
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different obstructions, the study would be a worthwhile. 
\ 
Examining what barriers cn development are present or were 
present in Latin and Central America and Asia would be 
helpful in advancing development studies. 
While the researcher believes that the three barriers 
found in Cameroon, Kenya, and Swaziland are interdependent, 
a study examining what policies, incentives, or initiatives 
a government makes to reduce the effect of the obstructing 
factors would aid development studies to move forward. 
Understanding what policy makers can do to reduce HIV/AIDS, 
unequal land distribution, and corruption in each country 
can aid the county to experience the effects of education 
on development that other countries have experienced. As 
stated above any research in what policies, incentives, or 
initiatives in other countries in Africa and other regions 
would be helpful in guiding future development studies and 
policy makers. 
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